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EXHAUSTING EXTRATERRITORIALITY
John A. Rothchild*

INTRODUCTION

Exhaustion is one of the most significant doctrines
limiting the power that intellectual property laws grant to
rights owners. It serves to maintain the balance between the
prerogatives of rights owners and those of consumers of
intellectual property that the legislature deems appropriate.
In copyright law, exhaustion-usually referred to as the firstsale rule-limits the copyright owner's public distribution
right with respect to a particular copy or phonorecord. 1 In
patent law, exhaustion limits the patent owner's right to
control the sale and use of an article embodying a protected
invention.
The principle underlying the idea of intellectual property
rights exhaustion is simple to state: the intellectual property
laws entitle a rights holder to only a single reward
attributable to the sale (or other transaction resulting in a
change in ownership) of an article that embodies protected
intellectual property. A subsequent sale of that article does
not entitle the rights holder to any additional reward.2 Thus,
* Associate Professor, Wayne State University Law School. @2011 John
A. Rothchild.
1. A first sale also limits the public display right. 17 U.S.C. § 109(c)
(2006). That aspect of the first-sale rule is not central to the issues addressed in
this Article.
2. In U.S. law, this principle is subject to a limited exception involving
rental, lease, or lending of a copy of a computer program or sound recording. 17
U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(a) (2006). Droit de suite, which gives the creator of certain
works of art the right to a royalty payment upon resale of an art object, is
another limited exception. Such a right exists under the laws of several
countries, including the European Union, and under California law, but not in
U.S. federal law. See Mara Grumbo, Accepting Droit de Suite As an Equal and
Fair Measure Under Intellectual Property Law and Contemplation of Its
Implementation in the United States Post Passage of the EU Directive, 30
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a copyright owner may demand any price he likes for the
right to distribute a copy (such as a book, music CD, movie
DVD, or software DVD) to the public. But once he has
transferred a copy at whatever price he chooses to accept, he
is not entitled to any additional reward on account of the
copyright when the purchaser sells or otherwise disposes of
that particular copy. A patent owner may likewise charge
whatever the market will bear for the right to sell or use an
article embodying his patented invention. However, if the
article's new owner chooses to resell it, or to use it in a way
not contemplated by the patentee, the patentee has no right
to extract any additional patent-based reward from the
subsequent transaction or use.
Application of the single-reward principle in domestic
contexts has caused few difficulties. In cases where some of
the relevant conduct occurs outside the United States,
however, some courts have held that an authorized first sale
does not result in exhaustion, with the result that the rights
owner becomes entitled to more than a single reward in
connection with disposition of a particular article.3 The
courts have justified these results on the ground that finding
exhaustion under such circumstances would constitute an
impermissible extraterritorial application of the patent and
copyright laws.
The issue is a significant one. Both copyright and patent
law are increasingly invoked by rights owners who seek to
segment their markets geographically. To do so, owners must
prevent the practice of parallel importation. Under this
practice, a manufacturer sells its products abroad, and some
other person imports them into the United States without the
manufacturer's authorization. The imported products are
then offered for sale in competition with products that the
manufacturer seeks to market in the United States at a
higher price. If a first sale abroad exhausts the rights
owner's ability to control importation via patent or copyright,
preventing parallel imports becomes much more difficult and
arbitrage erodes the owner's ability to price goods higher in
the U.S. market.

HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 357, 365-72 (2008).

3. See discussion infra Part II.

2011]

EXHAUSTING EXTRATERRITORIALITY

1189

In the copyright context, the issue has attracted the
attention of the Supreme Court, but remains unresolved. In
December 2010, the Supreme Court affirmed, by an equally
divided Court, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Omega S.A. v.
Costco Wholesale Corp.4 There, the Ninth Circuit held that
the sale of a copy or phonorecord embodying a work protected
by U.S. copyright does not exhaust the copyright if the article
was manufactured and sold abroad.' As a result of this rule,
an individual in the United States who purchases a book,
music CD, wristwatch with a copyrighted design engraved on
the back,' or bottle of shampoo with a copyrighted label'
could unwittingly be engaging in copyright infringement if
the copyright owner did not authorize importation into, or
sale in, the United States.'
In the area of patents, when courts address situations
involving a first sale abroad they have largely applied the
single-reward principle correctly. In a series of cases decided
in the 2000s, however, the Federal Circuit held that a first
sale abroad does not result in exhaustion.' As a result, the
patent owner is granted two patent rewards for its disposition
of a particular article. In the copyright area, by contrast,
most courts have failed to adhere to the single-reward
principle with respect to sales abroad of articles that were
manufactured outside the United States, granting the
copyright owner two rewards (or, in some holdings later
recognized as erroneous, an unlimited number of rewards) for
its disposition of a particular article."o

4. Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008),
affd by an equally divided Court, 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010) (Justice Kagan recused
herself from the case).
5. Id. at 983.
6. This is from the facts of Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d
982, 984 (9th Cir. 2008), affd by an equally divided Court, 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010).
7. This is from the facts of Quality King Distrib., Inc. v. L'anza Research
Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 138 (1998).
8. See Vartan J. Saravia, Shades of Gray: The Internet Market of
Copyrighted Goods and a Call for the Expansion of the First-SaleDoctrine, 15
Sw. J. INT'L L. 383, 393 (2009); Brief of Amici Curiae Public Knowledge et al. in
Support of Petitioner at 7-8, Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega S.A., 131 S. Ct.
565 (2010) (No. 08-1423).
9. See, e.g., Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 264 F.3d 1094 (Fed.
Cir. 2001); see discussion infra notes 105-15 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., BMG Music v. Perez, 952 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1991); see
discussion infra notes 153-55 and accompanying text.
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In what follows, this Article will show that holding
copyright rights to be exhausted by a first sale abroad of a
copy that is manufactured abroad, or holding patent rights to
be exhausted by a first sale that occurs abroad, does not
constitute extraterritorial application of the relevant statutes.
The involvement of foreign conduct accordingly furnishes no
occasion for the courts to deviate from the single-reward
principle by holding that the first sale does not result in
Thus, these decisions have unjustifiably
exhaustion.
contracted the scope of the exhaustion doctrine in these two
areas, conferring powers on patent and copyright owners that
Congress did not intend.
Part I of this Article provides basic information about
exhaustion and the single-reward principle. Part II examines
the patent and copyright cases applying the exhaustion
doctrine in contexts that involve conduct occurring outside
the United States, and assesses which of the cases adhere to
the single-reward principle and which do not. Part III then
explicates the doctrine pertaining to extraterritorial
application of U.S. law. This discussion will show that
application of the exhaustion doctrine under the
circumstances presented in the patent and copyright cases
referenced above would not constitute extraterritorial
application of the relevant statute. Accordingly, the grounds
that courts have invoked to justify their deviation from the
single-reward principle are not well taken. The Article
concludes by arguing that courts should repudiate those
holdings, and rule that the location of a first sale is irrelevant
to the question whether the sale results in exhaustion of
patent or copyright rights.
I.

EXHAUSTION AND THE SINGLE-REWARD PRINCIPLE

In both copyright and patent law, the exhaustion doctrine
cuts off certain prerogatives of the rights owner with respect
to a particular article once ownership of the article has been
transferred, by sale or otherwise, with the authorization of
the rights owner.
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Copyright
In copyright, the first-sale rule first arose as a judgemade doctrine, which Congress subsequently adopted by
codifying it in the Copyright Act." In Bobbs-Merrill Co. v.
Straus,12 the Court addressed a situation in which a book
publisher, as copyright owner, attempted to control the retail
price at which its books might be sold. To this end, it printed
on each book's copyright page: "The price of this book at retail
is one dollar net. No dealer is licensed to sell it at a less price,
and a sale at a less price will be treated as an infringement of
the copyright.""
The publisher sought to enforce its
copyright against a retailer who sold the book for eighty-nine
cents, arguing that the retailer's action infringed its exclusive
right to "vend" the book.' 4 But the Court rejected the
publisher's argument, holding that the publisher's right to
control distribution of a book was exhausted with respect to a
particular copy once that copy changed hands:
To add to the right of exclusive sale the authority to
control all future retail sales, by a notice that such sales
must be made at a fixed sum, would give a right not
included in the terms of the statute, and, in our view,
extend its operation, by construction, beyond its
meaning ... .1
In justification of this outcome, the Court adumbrated the
single-reward principle: "The owner of the copyright in this
case did sell copies of the book in quantities and at a price
satisfactory to it. It has exercised the right to vend."" In
other words, the right to vend consists of the right to sell a
particular copy at a price the copyright owner deems suitable.
Alternatively, if no taker can be found at the copyright
owner's price, the right to vend includes the right to refuse to
vend any copy at all. Once the copyright owner has accepted
a price for transferring ownership of a copy, the owner may
not invoke its copyright for a second time with respect to that
copy in an effort to acquire a second reward.

11. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006).

12. 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id. at 341.
Id.
Id. at 351.
Id.
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A year after the Supreme Court expressed the first-sale
rule in Bobbs-Merrill, Congress codified it in the 1909
Copyright Act." In adopting the rule, Congress accepted the
Court's rationale as well: namely, that the statute entitles a
copyright owner to only a single reward attributable to sale of
a particular copy. The same rule was carried forward into the
1976 Copyright Act, which states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the
owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made
under this title, or any person authorized by such owner,
is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner,
to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy
or phonorecord.18
Both after enactment of the 1909 Act' 9 and after the 1976
revision,20 courts have continued to state the single-reward
principle as the essence of the first-sale rule.

B. Patent
In patent law, as in copyright law, the exhaustion
doctrine arose as a judge-made rule. The earliest Supreme
Court case dealing with exhaustion involved the right of a
purchaser of a patented article to continue using the article
beyond the expiration of the original patent term. Bloomer v.

17. See Quality King Distrib., Inc. v. L'anza Research Int'l, Inc., 523 U.S.
135, 141-42 (1998) ("Congress subsequently codified our holding in BobbsMerrill that the exclusive right to 'vend' was limited to first sales of the work.").
18. 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006).
19. See Platt & Munk Co. v. Republic Graphics, Inc., 315 F.2d 847, 854 (2d
Cir. 1963) ("[Tlhe ultimate question embodied in the 'first sale' doctrine [is]
'whether or not there has been such a disposition of the article that it may fairly
be said that the patentee [or copyright proprietor] has received his reward for
the use of the article'. . . ." (third alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Masonite, 316 U.S. 265, 278 (1942))); Burke & Van Heusen, Inc. v. Arrow Drug,
Inc., 233 F. Supp. 881, 884 (E.D. Pa. 1964) ("[Tlhe ultimate question under the
'first sale' doctrine is whether or not there has been such a disposition of the
copyrighted article that it may fairly be said that the copyright proprietor has
received his reward for its use.").
20. See Sebastian Int'l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 847 F.2d
1093, 1099 (3d Cir. 1988) ("With respect to future distribution of those copies in
this country, clearly the copyright owner already has received its reward
through the purchase price."); Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. C & C Beauty Sales,
Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1378, 1389 (C.D. Cal. 1993) ("[Tlhe distribution right and the
first sale doctrine rest on the principle that the copyright owner is entitled to
realize no more and no less than the full value of each copy or phonorecord upon
its disposition.").

20111

EXHAUSTING EXTRATERRITORIALITY

1193

McQuewan2' involved the right of the purchaser of a patented
planing machine to continue using it during an extended
patent term. Holding that the purchaser could continue
using the machine, the Court explained: "[W]hen the machine
passes to the hands of the purchaser, it is no longer within
the limits of the monopoly. It passes outside of it, and is no
longer under the protection of the act of Congress."22
In Adams v. Burke,23 the Court addressed the right of a
purchaser to use the patented article outside the territorial
scope of the vendor's patent rights. The holder of a patent on
an improvement in coffin lids granted all rights to the patent
within a circle ten miles in radius centered on Boston to
Lockhart & Seelye, and granted such rights for the rest of the
country to Adams. 24 The defendant was an undertaker who
had purchased a patented coffin from Lockhart & Seelye in
Boston, but then used the coffin in a burial occurring
seventeen miles from Boston, beyond the territorial scope
granted to Lockhart & Seelye.2 5 Adams sued Burke for
infringement, but the Court ruled in Burke's favor. The
Court held that "the sale by a person who has the full right to
make, sell, and use such a machine carries with it the right to
the use of that machine to the full extent to which it can be
used in point of time."26 The Court justified its holding with a
statement of the single-reward principle:
[Tihe patentee or his assignee having in the act of sale
received all the royalty or consideration which he claims
for the use of his invention in that particular machine or
instrument, it is open to the use of the purchaser without
further restriction on account of the monopoly of the
patentees. 27
To hold otherwise would be to allow the patentee to collect
two rewards for the sale of a single patented article-one
from Lockhart & Seelye and the other from Adams.2 8
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

55 U.S. 539 (1852).
Id. at 549.
84 U.S. 453 (1873).
Id. at 453-54.
Id. at 454.
Id. at 455.
Id. at 456. See also id. ("[T]he patentee had received his consideration,

and it was no longer within the monopoly of the patent . . . ."). This decision

was followed, on similar facts, in Hobbie v. Jennison, 149 U.S. 355 (1893).
28. That a contrary holding would have resulted in a double reward to the
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These cases addressed the right of a purchaser to use the
article without further authorization from the patentee or its
assignee.
Subsequent cases extended the exhaustion
principle to the right to resell that article. In Keeler v.
Standard Folding Bed Co.,29 the patentee assigned its patent
"for an improvement in wardrobe bedsteads" for
Massachusetts to one person and assigned the same rights for
Michigan to another person.3 0 The defendants purchased a
carload of the beds in Michigan and sold them in
Massachusetts. The patent assignee for Massachusetts sued
the defendants for infringement. The Court held there was
no infringement, explaining: "[A] person who buys patented
articles from a person who has a right to sell, though within a
restricted territory, has a right to use and sell such articles in
all and any part of the United States . . . ."" As in Adams,

the Court justified its holding in terms of the single-reward
principle: when patentees "have made one or more of the
things patented, and have vended the same to others to be
used, they have parted to that extent with their exclusive
right, as they are never entitled to but one royalty for a
patented machine."3 2
The Supreme Court most recently reiterated the singlereward principle in United States v. Masonite Corp. 3 There,
the holder of patents on hardboard entered into a series of
"agency" agreements with sellers in a scheme to set minimum
resale prices on the hardboard that it manufactured. 34 The
Court found that this was a per se violation of the Sherman
patentee is clear on the assumption that the patentee was paid for his
assignments to Lockhart & Seelye and to Adams on a per-sale, royalty basis and
that the patentee was thus entitled to both a share of the price Burke paid to
Lockhart & Seelye as well as a share of the license fee that Adams demanded.
In this case, the assumption appears to be counterfactual, in that the patentee
received a lump-sum payment from each of the two assignees. Adams, 84 U.S.
The double reward is nonetheless implicit in the financial
at 456-57.
arrangements. If there were no limitation to a single reward, the patent would
be worth more to each assignee, and the patentee would be able to bargain for a
higher price.
29. 157 U.S. 659 (1895).
30. Id. at 659.
31. Id. at 664.
32. Id. at 663 (emphasis added) (quoting Mitchell v. Hawley, 83 U.S. 544,
547 (1872)). The Court had made the same statement previously in Bloomer v.
Millinger, 68 U.S. 340, 350 (1863).

33. 316 U.S. 265 (1942).
34. Id. at 268-69.
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Act unless the defendant's patents entitled it to such
downstream control of its products." Citing several of its
early patent exhaustion cases, the Court held that the Patent
Act accorded a patentee no such authority. It explained the
exhaustion doctrine in this way: "The test has been whether
or not there has been such a disposition of the article that it
may fairly be said that the patentee has received his reward
for the use of the article."3 6
C. Summary
In both the copyright and patent areas, the courts have
declared unmistakably that the touchstone for determining
whether a rights owner's intellectual property rights, with
respect to a particular article, are exhausted is whether the
rights owner disposed of the article for a price he deemed
suitable, and thereby obtained the reward to which the law
entitles him. Neither a copyright owner nor a patentee is
entitled to two monopoly rewards from the sale of a single
article.
II.

EXHAUSTION IN CONTEXTS INVOLVING SOME FOREIGN
CONDUCT

In the cases discussed above, all of the relevant conduct
occurred within the United States. In all of them, the
holdings-that a copyright or patent as to a particular article
was exhausted by the first authorized sale-are consistent
with the single-reward principle. However, when some of the
relevant conduct occurs outside the United States,
complications arise. In some cases, courts resolve the issue
consistently with the single-reward principle, sometimes even
explicitly invoking that principle. In other cases, however,
the court's decision that a first sale does not result in
exhaustion allows the rights owner to demand a double
reward.
35. Id. at 274.
36. Id. at 278. On the same day, the Court decided United States v. Univis
Lens Co., in which it similarly stated: "Our decisions have uniformly recognized
that the purpose of the patent law is fulfilled with respect to any particular
article when the patentee has received his reward for the use of his invention by
the sale of the article, and that once that purpose is realized the patent law
affords no basis for restraining the use and enjoyment of the thing sold." 316
U.S. 241, 251 (1942).
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This Part reviews these cases and assesses their
consistency with the single-reward principle. The rationales
of the decisions that fail to apply the single-reward principle
indicate that these outcomes result from a misapplication of
the presumption against extraterritoriality.
A. Patent Exhaustion Cases with a Foreign Component
These cases may be divided into two categories: (1) those
in which the U.S. patentee had already received its reward
due to disposition of an article as the result of a sale outside
the United States and seeks to control use or resale within
the United States; and (2) those in which the patentee
invokes a U.S. patent as entitlement to its first and only
reward for disposition of the article. Fidelity to the singlereward principle would mean that the patentee's rights in the
article should be held to be exhausted in the first category of
cases but not in the second. That expectation proves largely
to be fulfilled, but with several important exceptions. It is
best to consider the cases chronologically.
1. The Cases
The earliest case of which I am aware that involves a
foreign-conduct exhaustion issue is Brown v. Duchesne.3 7 The
Court, however, left the issue unaddressed. In Duchesne, a
French schooner, the Alcyon, called at the port of Boston on a
voyage that originated, and would terminate, at the French
colony of St. Peters." The ship was fitted with a type of gaff"
that was commonly used in France, but the plaintiff claimed
to own a U.S. patent that the gaff embodied. Plaintiff sued
the ship's master, a French subject, for infringement.
Conceding that all persons within U.S. territory, whether
residents or visitors, were subject to U.S. laws, and that the
language of the patent laws, "taken by themselves, and
literally construed, without regard to the object in view,
would seem to sanction the claim of the plaintiff," the Court
nevertheless held that there was no infringement.4 0
37. 60 U.S. 183 (1856).
38. Id. at 193. St. Peters is on the island of Miquelon, which is situated off
the eastern seaboard of Canada, about thirty miles south of Newfoundland.
39. A gaff is a spar or pole that helps to support a ship's sail with a
particular rigging design.
40. Brown, 60 U.S. at 194.
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Evidently uncomfortable with the prospect of applying U.S.
patent law to a French ship that had been built in France
(where the gaff was unpatented), was manned and owned by
French subjects, and was only transitorily in U.S. waters for
commercial purposes, the Court advanced several
justifications for the outcome. First, the Constitution's grant
to Congress of the power to "promote the progress of science
and useful arts" does not extend to regulating "commerce, or
the vehicles of commerce, which belong to a foreign nation,
and occasionally visit our ports in their commercial
Second, the patent laws do not operate
pursuits."4 1
extraterritorially, and the defendant did not make, sell, or
effectively use the invention while it was at Boston's harbor,
but only in places outside U.S. jurisdiction.4 2 Third, Congress
could not have intended the patent laws to be applied in a
way that would grant a patentee a claim where he had
suffered no damages, would "seriously embarrass the
commerce of the country," or would "embarrass the treatymaking power."4 3
The opinion was written by Chief Justice Taney, who four
years earlier had authored Bloomer v. McQuewan," which
established the principle that a first sale of a patented article
exhausts patent rights with respect to that article. The
opinion does not address the question of exhaustion,
presumably because the defendant did not raise it as a
defense.
If the Court had considered the question of
exhaustion, it ought (consistently with the single-reward
principle) to have found that the plaintiffs patent rights as to
the gaff on the Alcyon were not exhausted by the first sale of
the gaff in France. The U.S. patentee received no reward
from that sale. A dictum statement by the Court about what
would have been the case had the gaff been manufactured or
sold on the ship while in Boston's harbor, rather than merely
used there, is consistent with that principle:
If it had been manufactured on her deck while she was
lying in the port of Boston, or if the captain had sold it
there, he would undoubtedly have trespassed upon the
rights of the plaintiff, and would have been justly
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 195.
Id. at 195-96.
Id. at 195-98.
55 U.S. 539 (1852). See also supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
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answerable for the profit and advantage he thereby
obtained.45
The first case to address foreign-conduct exhaustion of
patent rights is Holiday v. Mattheson.* The plaintiff, who
owned a U.S. patent on an unspecified invention, sold an
article embodying the invention in England. The purchaser
then resold that article, also in England, to the defendant.
The patentee invoked his patent rights in an effort to prevent
the defendant from using or selling the article in the United
States. 47 The court, in a brief opinion, held that once a
patentee has sold a patented article unconditionally, "the
purchaser acquires the whole right of the vendor in the thing
sold: the right to use it, to repair it, and to sell it to others."4 8
The court gave no indication that the location of the first sale,
outside the United States, affected the analysis in any way.
The court relied upon several cases, including the Supreme
Court decisions in Bloomer v. McQuewan and Mitchell v.
Hawley, which had elaborated the principle of exhaustion in a
domestic context. Although the court did not discuss it in
these terms, the outcome and logic of the decision are
consistent with the single-reward principle. The patentee
received a reward satisfactory to him when he first sold the
article in England. He was not entitled to a second reward
when a downstream purchaser chose to use or sell the article
in the United States.
The next case in the series, Boesch v. Graff," featured a
patent on an improvement to lamp-burners. The inventors
obtained patents on the invention in both the United States
and Germany and assigned the U.S. patent to the plaintiff.
The defendants purchased the burners in Germany and sold
them in the United States.o The vendor in Germany, Hecht,
had not received any authorization from the patentees, but
was entitled to sell the burners under a German law that
protected the rights of prior users. 51 The Court held that the
45. Brown, 60 U.S. at 196.
46. 24 F. 185 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1885).
47. Id. at 185.
48. Id.
49. 133 U.S. 697 (1890).
50. Id. at 698-99.
51. The German patent law "provided that 'the patent does not affect
persons who, at the time of the patentee's application, have already commenced
to make use of the invention in the country, or made the preparations requisite
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assignee of the U.S. patent was entitled to collect a royalty
from the defendants on the burners imported from
Germany.5 2 It arrived at this determination after reviewing
several of its prior cases, decided in a domestic context, which
turned upon a distinction between the patentee's exclusive
right to make and vend an article embodying the invention
and its exclusive right to use the article.53 Those cases
yielded the principle that authorized sale of an article
exhausts the patentee's right to control use of the article by
the purchaser or his transferees, but does not exhaust the
patentee's right to control subsequent vending of the article; 54
nor, of course, does it exhaust the patentee's right to control
the making of other articles embodying the invention.
Because the defendants were charged with selling (vending)
the lamp-burners, that rule compelled the Court's
determination that the defendants infringed the U.S. patent.
The Court then went on to address, very briefly, the
international aspect of the case. In its entirety, the Court
said:
The right which Hecht had to make and sell the burners
in Germany was allowed him under the laws of that
country, and purchasers from him could not be thereby
authorized to sell the articles in the United States in
defiance of the rights of patentees under a United States
patent. A prior foreign patent operates under our law to
limit the duration of the subsequent patent here, but that
is all. The sale of articles in the United States under a
United States patent cannot be controlled by foreign laws.
This disposes of the second error relied on.55
This statement articulates an independent rationale for
the Court's holding that the U.S. patentee is entitled to exact
a royalty from the defendants for the right to resell the lampburners in the United States. One interpretation some
courts5 6 have placed upon this language is that the sale of an
for such use."' Id. at 701.
52. Id. at 709.
53. Id. at 705-06.
54. Id. at 702-03. The Court first held that an authorized first sale
exhausts the right to vend in Keeler v. StandardFolding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659
(1895), which it decided five years after Boesch v. Graff. See supra notes 29-32
and accompanying text.
55. Boesch, 133 U.S. at 703.
56. See, e.g., Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 264 F.3d 1094 (Fed.
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article in a foreign country, in accordance with the patent law
of that country, cannot exhaust the rights of a U.S. patentee
with respect to subsequent use or sale of that article. In other
words, the single-reward principle does not apply when a first
sale in a foreign country is followed by a resale (or use) of the
article in the United States. For several reasons, this is not a
supportable reading of the statement. First, it is dictum: it
follows the Court's explanation of its holding on the fully
sufficient ground that a first sale exhausts only the right to
use, not the right to vend. Second, the facts of the case do not
present a situation in which the U.S. patentee gained any
patent-based reward by virtue of the sale abroad; indeed,
neither the patentee nor any assignee or licensee gained any
reward as a result of the first sale from -Hecht to the
defendants in Germany because Hecht's prior-user right
allowed him to make and sell the burners without paying any
royalty to any patentee."
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the Boesch
statement in Keeler is the most persuasive reason against
interpreting the statement to mean that foreign sales do not
trigger exhaustion. In Keeler, the Court held that one who
purchases a patented article in the United States is free to
use or resell the article anywhere in the country, even in a
territory where the patent rights are owned by a person other
than the original seller. 8 In the course of its opinion, the
Court rejected the contention that Boesch calls for a different
result, explaining that "neither the patentee nor any assignee
had ever received any royalty or given any license to use the
patented article in any part of the United States.""9 That is,
the Court invoked the single-reward principle to explain how
Boesch differed from Keeler. In Boesch, the U.S patentee had
not received any patent-based reward from the first sale in
Cir. 2001); Daimler Mfg. Co. v. Conklin, 170 F. 70 (2d Cir. 1909); Griffin v.
Keystone Mushroom Farm, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 1283 (E.D. Pa. 1978); see also
infra notes 67-71, 77-84, 105-15 and accompanying text.
57. See Harold C. Wegner, Post-Quanta,Post-Sale Patentee Controls, 7 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 682, 698 (2008) ("Boesch has nothing to do
with patent exhaustion because there was no patent right, German or
otherwise, that was exercised.").
58. Keeler, 157 U.S. at 664 ("[A] person who buys patented articles from a
person who has a right to sell, though within a restricted territory, has a right
to use and sell such articles in all and any part of the United States. . .
59. Id. at 665.
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Germany, while in Keeler the patentee had received just that
reward from its first sale of the article. Two lower courts
have adopted this construction of Boesch as well.o
Accordingly, Boesch is properly viewed as holding that
the sale of an article in a foreign country from which the U.S.
patentee derives no patent-based reward, either directly or
through an assignee or licensee, does not exhaust the
patentee's exclusive right to vend that article. This is based
on either of two alternative rationales: (1) a first sale
exhausts the patentee's exclusive right to use, but not the
exclusive right to vend; or (2) a first sale (whether domestic or
abroad) does not exhaust any of the patentee's rights if made
under circumstances that do not result in any patent-based
reward to the patentee. The result and rationale in Boesch
are thus consistent with the single-reward principle.
In Dickerson v. Matheson," patents for an improvement
to a type of coloring matter were issued in both the United
States and Germany. Through assignment, the German
company Bayer owned both patents. Bayer licensed to
another German company, the Berlin Company, the rights to
sell the material under both patents. The defendants,
through an agent, purchased a quantity of the material
manufactured by the Berlin Company and imported it into
the United States.6 2 The seller's agent unequivocally stated
its unwillingness to sell the material for importation into the
United States, and the goods were marked with a label
reading "[tihe importation into the United States of North
America is forbidden."6 3 However, the buyer's agent did not
disclose the shipment's destination and indeed took steps to
conceal the identity of the destination. 64 The court held that
importation of the material infringed the U.S. patent, on the
ground that the sale was not an unrestricted one, but was
explicitly subject to a prohibition against importation into the
United States.

60. See Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corp. v. United Aircraft Eng'g Corp., 266
F. 71, 77 (2d Cir. 1920); Sanofi, S.A. v. Med-Tech Veterinarian Prod., Inc., 565
F. Supp. 931, 937-38 (D.N.J. 1983); see also infra notes 72-76, 85-93 and
accompanying text.
61. 57 F. 524 (2d Cir. 1893).
62. Id. at 525.
63. Id. at 525-26.
64. Id.
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The court relied implicitly on the single-reward principle,
expressed in several dictum statements. The court explained:
A purchaser in a foreign country, of an article patented in
that country and also in the United States, from the
owner of each patent, or from a licensee under each
patent, who purchases without any restrictions upon the
extent of his use or power of sale, acquires an unrestricted
ownership in the article, and can use or sell it in this
country. 65
Under such circumstances, the patent owner will have
received its reward from the initial sale in the foreign
country, and is not entitled to a second reward upon
importation into the United States. On the other hand, the
court continued:
A purchaser in a foreign country of an article patented in
that country and also in the United States, from a licensee
under the foreign patent only, does not give the purchaser
a right to import the article into, and to sell it in, the
United States, without the license or consent of the owner
of the United States patent. 6
In other words, where the licensee in the foreign country is
not identified with the holder of the U.S. patent, a sale in the
foreign country does not reward the U.S. patentee and
accordingly that patentee is entitled to a reward attributable
to the importation.

Daimler Manufacturing Co. v. Conklin" involved a
defendant who purchased an automobile in Germany while on
a visit and brought it back home to the United States for
personal use. The car was manufactured in Germany by

65. Id. at 527. The court noted this conclusion followed from the Supreme
Court cases holding that a first sale exhausts the patentee's rights in a domestic
setting, finding no grounds for any different rule to apply in cases with an
international component: "The cases which have been heretofore decided by the
supreme court in regard to the unrestricted ownership by purchasers in this
country of articles patented in this country, and sold to such purchasers without
limitation or condition, lead up to this principle." Id.
66. Id. In a case based on similar facts, the Eighth Circuit arrived at a
similar dictum statement of the rule of exhaustion based on a foreign first sale:
"l1ne who purchases in a foreign country, of others than the owners of the
United States patent or their vendees, pays nothing, either directly or
indirectly, to the owners of the patent, and therefore he acquires no right to
make, use, or vend the article which he buys within the territorial limits of their
monopoly." Dickerson v. Tinling, 84 F. 192, 194 (8th Cir. 1897).
67. 170 F. 70 (2d Cir. 1909).
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Daimler Motorem Gesellsehaft. It incorporated inventions
protected by U.S. patents, which were assigned to Daimler
Manufacturing Company of New York.68 The U.S. company
and one of its licensed dealers sued the defendant for
infringement based on the unauthorized importation."
Consistent with the single-reward principle, the appellate
court held that the importation was infringing.
The
inventions were not, as the lower court found, covered by any
German patent. 70 The sale of the car in Germany, therefore,
did not result in any reward for the owner of the U.S. patent
or its licensees.
The court's reasoning, however, suggests that it would
have reached the same outcome even if it resulted in a double
reward. After describing the decision in Boesch, the court
asked rhetorically: "The sale by a German patentee of a
patented article may take it out of the monopoly of the
German patent, but how can it take it out of the monopoly of
the American patentee who has not sold?"7 ' Thus the court
derived from Boesch the principle that sale of an article
abroad does not exhaust the rights of a U.S. patentee with
respect to that article. While it is true that the sale abroad
did not result in exhaustion under the circumstances
presented in Boesch or Daimler, as explained above the
broader proposition that a foreign sale can never trigger
exhaustion is not fairly derived from Boesch. In fact, the
proposition is contradicted by the Court's explication of
Boesch in Keeler.
In Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corp. v. United Aircraft
Engineering Corp.,72 the plaintiff was an aircraft
manufacturer and the holder of U.S. and Canadian patents
on inventions used in its planes. During World War I,
plaintiff entered into contracts with the British government
under which it manufactured, in Canada, airplanes
incorporating those inventions. The plaintiff then sold the
airplanes to the British government. After the war, the
British government sold the planes it no longer needed.
68. Id. at 70.
69. Daimler Mfg. Co. v. Conklin, 160 F. 679, 680-82 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908),
rev'd, 170 F. 70 (2d Cir. 1909).
70. Id. at 682.
71. Daimler Mfg. Co., 170 F. at 72.
72. 266 F. 71 (2d Cir. 1920).
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Defendant purchased some of the planes and sold them in the
United States without plaintiffs authorization."
The
plaintiff sued for infringement. The court found that the
plaintiff had no right to control sale of the airplanes in the
United States. It held "the law to be that the British
government obtained a full and unqualified right to use and
sell the planes and engines, and that this right passed to all
subsequent purchasers, and therefore to this defendant."7 4 In
other words, plaintiffs patent rights were exhausted after the
first sale of the airplanes, which occurred in Canada with
plaintiffs authorization.
The court's holding, and its further discussion of the
issue, are consistent with the single-reward principle. It
categorized the cases that plaintiff relied upon into two
groups, both of which it found distinguishable. The first
group included cases "in which there has been a sale of a
patented article, or a license to manufacture, but
accompanied by explicit and unequivocal restrictions."" The
second group, including Boesch and Daimler, consisted of
"[t]hose in which there has been no participation whatever by
the owner of the patent, either as a party or as a privy, in the
putting out of the article which is alleged to infringe."
In
this group of cases, as discussed above, the patent owner did
not receive any reward attributable to the initial sale and the
patent rights were accordingly not exhausted. This was the
factor that, in the court's view, distinguished those cases from
the one at bar: whether the plaintiff had already received the
one and only reward to which the patent laws entitle him
upon disposition of a particular patented article.
In the next case to address the issue of foreign-conduct
exhaustion, the court failed to adhere to the single-reward
principle. In Griffin v. Keystone Mushroom Farm, Inc.," the
plaintiff owned both U.S. and Italian patents on a composting
machine. It assigned exclusive rights to make, use, and sell
the machine in the United States to Longwood and the
exclusive right to "practice

73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

. . . the art" in Italy to

Id. at 72-74.
Id. at 77.
Id.
Id.
453 F. Supp. 1283 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
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Carminati." The defendant bought several of the machines
from Carminati and had them delivered to the United States,
where he used and sold them without authorization from
The patentee sued for
Longwood or the patentee.
infringement." The defendant argued that the first sale of
the machines in Italy exhausted the patent as to those
machines, allowing him to use and sell them without further
authorization. For this proposition, the defendant relied on
cases including Adams and Bloomer, discussed above. 0 The
court held those cases to be inapplicable, however, where the
first sale occurs outside the United States: "[T]he defendant
seeks to extend beyond national borders the rule . . .
concerning escape from the patent monopoly by purchase
from an authorized seller."" The court considered that the
outcome was compelled by Boesch,8 2 from which it derived the
principle that sale of an article in a foreign country cannot
exhaust the rights of the U.S. patent owner under U.S. law.
The court explicitly considered, and rejected, defendant's
invocation of the single-reward principle. Defendant argued
that a finding of infringement "would give plaintiff," as owner
of both the U.S. and Italian patents, "a windfall 'double
recovery,' but the court thought otherwise.8 It explained
that the two patents gave rise to two independent sets of
rights, and plaintiff was entitled to invoke both sets of rights:
The sale or use of each machine in both countries
represents potentially two separate torts against the
plaintiff and infringes potentially on two separate sets of
rights held by him . . . . The non-tortiousness of

defendant's conduct in Italy cannot enter into an
adjudication of the plaintiffs rights in this country. 8 4
As discussed above, Boesch is not properly interpreted as
standing for the proposition that a foreign sale cannot
exhaust U.S. patent rights. The Court's subsequent opinion
in Keeler indicates that the outcome in Boesch resulted from
the fact that the patentee had not received any reward from
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
Graff..

Id. at 1284-85.
Id. at 1283-84.
Id. at 1284.
Id.
Id. ("We find this case to be controlled by the decision in Boesch v.
..

).

83. Id. at 1285.
84. Id.
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the initial sale abroad, and that Boesch does not hold that a
foreign sale can never trigger exhaustion of U.S. patent
rights.

In Sanoft, S.A. v. Med-Tech VeterinarianProducts, Inc.,85
the plaintiff was a French drug company, Sanofi, that owned
the U.S. patent on a tranquilizer drug. Sanofi granted to
American Home Products the exclusive right to sell the drug
in the United States. 6
Defendant, through a broker,
purchased the drug in bulk from a wholly-owned subsidiary of
Sanofi in France.87 The seller advised the broker that there
was a U.S. patent on the drug, and indicated it could not be
purchased for a customer in the United States; the broker
fraudulently represented that the purchase was for a
customer located in South America. 8 The court held, first,
that Sanofi could not invoke its patent rights to prevent sale
of the drug in the United States. Sanofi argued that Boesch
and Griffin were controlling authority, but the court
distinguished those cases, explaining:
In Boesch, it was not the patentee who made the sale
abroad. In fact, it was not even a licensee of the patentee
who made the sale. Rather, the seller was one who had a
right to sell by operation of the patent laws of
Germany.. . . Under the circumstances of Boesch, the
patentee neither received compensation for the use of his
invention, nor consented to its importation into this
country. Here, however, it was the patentee that made
and profited from the initial sale abroad ....
While this distinction was true enough, and highly
relevant in applying the single-reward principle, the court
overlooked another critical distinction: in the case at bar,
there was no French patent on the drug.9 0 Therefore, Sanofi
did not receive any patent-based reward on account of its
initial sale of the drug in France, and allowing it to extract a
royalty based on the sale and use of the drug in the United
States would have been consistent with the single-reward
principle.
85.
86.
87.
88.
fraud,
89.
90.

565 F. Supp. 931 (D.N.J. 1983).
Id. at 934.
Id. at 934-35.
Because the court found that the defendant was not implicated in the
it treated the sale as an unrestricted one. Id. at 935.
Id. at 937-38.
Id. at 938.
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The court went on to hold that although Sanofi's rights
were exhausted, American Home Products ("AHP") did have
the right to demand a royalty from defendant because it held
an exclusive license to sell the drug in the United States.91
This result is consistent with the single-reward principle
because Sanofi earned its single reward through its U.S.
licensee. However, the court's reasoning does not follow from
the single-reward principle. The court reasoned that: (1)
Sanofi assigned to AHP the exclusive right to sell the product
in the United States; (2) a patentee cannot convey to a
purchaser any rights beyond those that it itself possesses; (3)
Sanofi itself did not have the right to sell the product within
AHP's exclusive territory; and therefore, (4) the defendant,
which purchased the product from Sanofi, did not have the
right to sell the product in that territory.92 This reasoning,
however, is inconsistent with the decisions holding that, in a
domestic context, one who purchases a patented article in an
unrestricted transaction authorized by the patentee gains the
right to use and sell that article throughout the United
States, even in geographical areas where another person has
been assigned exclusive rights under the patent. In such
situations, the purchaser of the article has the right to use or
sell the article within a particular geographical territory even
though the seller from whom he acquired the article would
not have been authorized to sell it in that territory. 93

91. Id. at 942.
92. Id. at 939.
93. See Keeler v. Standard Folding Bed Co., 157 U.S. 659, 664 (1895) ("[A]
person who buys patented articles from a person who has a right to sell, though
within a restricted territory, has a right to use and sell such articles in all and
any part of the United States . . . ."); Sec. Materials Co. v. Mixermobile Co., 72
F. Supp. 450, 455 (S.D. Cal. 1947) ("[T]he ordinary buyer may use or resell
anywhere and at any time."); Clayton M. Hogue & Berrien Cty. Package Co. v.
Wise, 35 U.S.P.Q. 72, 72 (W.D. Mich. 1933) ("'A grant of an exclusive right to
make, use, and sell a particular patented invention, within a particular part of
the United States, confers the right to use and sell, anywhere within the United
States, those specimens of that invention which are made and sold under the
grant and within the territory covered thereby.'" (quoting Walker on Patents,
sec. 335)); Russell v. Tilghman, 275 F. 235, 236 (E.D. Va. 1921) ("[T]he
purchaser of the patented article . . . acquires also with the purchase the
privilege of using it or selling it again in all parts of the United States."); Free
Sewing Mach. Co. v. Bry-Block Mercantile Co., 204 F. 632, 634-45 (W.D. Tenn.
1913) (relying on Keeler).
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In Kabushiki Kaisha Hattori Seiko v. Refac Technology
Development Corp.,94 the court was required to construe an
agreement between Refac and Hattori settling a previous
lawsuit. Refac, which owned both U.S. and foreign patents, 95
granted to Hattori a license to make and sell articles
embodying several of its patents, including one on electronic
timepieces.
Hattori sold patented watch components to
Advance Watch Co. at a location outside the United States.
Advance incorporated the components into watches and sold
them in the United States.
Refac sued Advance for
infringement in a Michigan district court, claiming that the
license permitted Hattori to sell patented goods in the United
States only. Hattori then brought this action against Refac
seeking, among other things, a declaration that the license
permitted Hattori to make sales worldwide and a
determination that Hattori's sales abroad did not make it
contributorily liable for Advance's sales in the United
States." The court construed the license in Hattori's favor,
holding that it permitted Hattori to sell the patented items
both in the United States and abroad." It went on to hold
that Hattori's first sale abroad of patented articles exhausted
the patent as to those articles:
In general, the first sale of a product by a patentee or
licensee exhausts the patent monopoly, and deprives the
holder of patent rights of any further control over resale of
the product. This principle applies to an authorized first
sale abroad by a patentee or licensee who also has the
right to sell in the United States. Following such a sale,
the holder of United States patent rights is barred from
preventing resale in the United States or from collecting a
royalty when the foreign customer resells the article
here.9 8
Because Refac's patent rights were exhausted by the first sale
of the articles abroad (via its licensee Hattori), "Refac may
not claim royalties on Hattori products purchased abroad and

94. 690 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
95. The court, however, did not rely on Refac's ownership of foreign patents
applying the watch components because Hattori did not premise its argument
on such patents. Id. at 1343 n.3.
96. Id. at 1341-42.
97. Id. at 1342.
98. Id.
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resold in the United States by third parties."99 The result
was a straightforward application of the single-reward
principle. Refac was credited with the reward attributable to
the first sale abroad, and was not entitled to a second reward
when the articles were resold in the United States.
In PCI Parfums et Cosmetiques International v.
Perfumania, Inc.,"o

PCI was

a French company

that

manufactured perfumes, and held U.S. patents on its perfume
bottles. PCI granted an exclusive license to Campbell &
Thiselton to make, use, and sell the bottles in the United
States. These two entities sued defendant for selling the
bottles in the United States without authorization.'o The
court's opinion was very brief and did not thoroughly describe
the dispute's factual background, but it appears that
defendant was purchasing bottles of the perfume abroad and
selling them in the United States as gray-market goods.102
Defendant sought dismissal of the action on the ground that
the patentee's rights were exhausted by the first sale abroad.
The court denied the motion to dismiss. It observed that
patent rights are exhausted only upon "an authorized sale of
the patented item," which meant that plaintiffs could prevail
if they showed that defendant's "acquisition of the patented
items was not pursuant to an authorized sale."103 This would
be the case if plaintiffs "could establish that the patented
items sold by defendant were purchased abroad and then
imported for resale in the United States without the consent
of Campbell & Thiselton, the exclusive United States
licensee."1 04 The logic of the court's reasoning is obscure: why
would the absence of consent by the U.S. licensee to
importation affect whether the prior sale to defendant abroad
was an authorized one? The fact that the court cited Boesch
and Sanoft in support of the last-quoted statement suggests
99. Id.
100. 35 U.S.P.Q.2d 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
101. Id. at 1160.
102. "'Gray-market' goods, or 'parallel imports,' are genuine products
possessing a brand name protected by a trademark or copyright. They are
typically manufactured abroad, and purchased and imported into the United
States by third parties, thereby bypassing the authorized U.S. distribution
channels." Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc., 38 F.3d 477, 481
n.6 (9th Cir. 1994).
103. PCI Parfums et Cosmetiques Int'l, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1159.
104. Id.
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that its reasoning was premised on the circumstance that
PCI's first sale abroad was, as in those cases, not pursuant to
any patent. Although the court does not say so, it seems
probable that the bottles were not patented under French
law. On the assumption that there was no French patent, the
result is consistent with the single-reward principle. PCI
received no patent-based reward on account of its first sale of
the bottles abroad. Therefore, it was entitled, through its
licensee Campbell & Thistleton, to a reward due to exercise of
its U.S. patent rights.
We arrive, finally, at Jazz Photo Corp. v. International
Trade Commission,"o in which the Federal Circuit held that
patent rights are not exhausted by a sale that occurs outside
the United States.
The case marked an important
installment in the long-running dispute between Fuji Photo
Film Company, a manufacturer of single-use disposable
cameras, and various companies in the business of
refurbishing the used cameras and reselling them in the
United States. Fuji held a number of patents on the cameras,
and invoked those patents to prevent the refurbishing,
importation, and sale of used cameras. 0 6 The used cameras
were acquired by certain enterprises located overseas, and
were refurbished through a series of operations including
removing the cardboard cover, opening the camera body,
replacing the battery, adding new film, and applying a new
0
cardboard cover.o'
The case raised two key issues. The first
issue was whether the process of refurbishment constituted
"repair" of the cameras or "reconstruction," as those terms are
used in patent law. "Reconstruction" of a patented article
without authorization from the patentee is an infringement of
the exclusive right to "make" articles embodying the
patent. 0 8 "Repair" of a patented article, on the other hand, is
0
The court
within the prerogatives of the article's owner.o'
held that the refurbishing operations constituted "repair,"
and were therefore permissible actions by an owner of the
cameras.110
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

264 F.3d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1098.
Id.
Id. at 1102.
Id. at 1102-05.
Id. at 1105-07.
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That determination led the court to consider the second
issue: whether Fuji's patent rights on the cameras were
exhausted by its sale of the cameras. Exhaustion came into
play because the refurbisher s' rights were derivative of those
of the first purchaser: the right of repair "accompanies the
Whether exhaustion
article to succeeding owners.""'
occurred as to a particular camera, the court held, depended
on whether the camera was first sold in the United States or
abroad.112 This is because "United States patent rights are
not exhausted by products of foreign provenance. To invoke
the protection of the first sale doctrine, the authorized first
sale must have occurred under the United States patent."s1 3
Thus, unauthorized repair was permissible only as to
cameras "for which the United States patent right has been
exhausted by first sale in the United States."" 4 To support
that proposition the court cited only Boesch.
From the standpoint of the single-reward principle, the
court's reliance upon Boesch was inapposite. As discussed
above, that case does not stand for the proposition that a sale
overseas can never exhaust U.S. patent rights, but only that
no exhaustion occurs when the first sale did not result in a
patent-based reward. Moreover, the Jazz Photo court made
no reference to the several cases, discussed above, in which
courts have held that a foreign sale may exhaust U.S. patent
rights. 11
The Federal Circuit subsequently decided two other cases
that relied on the rule it stated in Jazz Photo. The first, Fuji
Photo Film Co., Ltd. v. Jazz Photo Corp.,1e was an appeal

after the remand following the Jazz Photo decision. Jazz
Photo argued that a first sale abroad should exhaust patent
rights as long as the patentee or its licensee authorized the
sale. The court emphatically rejected that argument: "The
111. Id. at 1103.
112. Id. at 1105.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See Daniel Erlikhman, Jazz Photo and the Doctrine of Patent
Exhaustion: Implications to TRIPs and InternationalHarmonizationof Patent
Protection, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 308, 313 (2003) (characterizing Jazz
Photo as "an important change in the U.S. application of exhaustion principles
to the case of parallel imports").
116. 394 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The second case, Fujifilm Corp. v.
Benun, 605 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2010), is discussed later. See infra notes 12930 and accompanying text.

1212

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW

[Vol:51

patentee's authorization of an international first sale does not
affect exhaustion of that patentee's rights in the United
States.""' It also expanded on its justification of the rule:
[T]his court in Jazz stated that only [single-use cameras]
sold within the United States under a United States
patent qualify for the repair defense under the exhaustion
doctrine. Moreover, Fuji's foreign sales can never occur
under a United States patent because the United States
patent system does not provide for extraterritorial
effect. 118
Several subsequent district court cases applied the Jazz
Photo rule uncritically, holding that a sale occurring outside
the United States does not exhaust U.S. patent rights.' 9
But, in LG Electronics, Inc. v. Hitachi, Ltd.,120 a district court
held that the Jazz Photo rule had been effectively overruled
by the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Quanta
Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc."' In Quanta, LG
Electronics ("LGE") owned U.S. patents relating to computer
microprocessor and memory chips. It licensed Intel to
produce chips embodying the patents, but the license
agreement included a limitation stipulating that no license
was granted to any third party to combine chips incorporating
the patents with any other component acquired from a source
other than Intel."' Quanta purchased chips from Intel and
used them to build computers that included components from
LGE sued Quanta for patent
non-Intel sources. 123
infringement based on its combination of the Intel chips with
non-Intel components. After rejecting LGE's argument that
exhaustion does not apply to method claims, the Court
addressed the issue whether Intel's authorized first sale of
the chips to Quanta exhausted LGE's patents as to those
chips. In view of the fact that LGE's patents could not be
fully practiced until the chips were combined with other
117. Fuji Photo Film, 394 F.3d at 1376.
118. Id.
119. See, e.g., Laserdynamics, Inc. v. Quanta Storage America, Inc., No. 2:06CV-348-TJW-CE, 2009 WL 3763444, at *1 (E.D. Tex. June 29, 2009); Minebea
Co., Ltd. v. Papst, 444 F. Supp. 2d 68, 140-41 (D.D.C. 2006); Minebea Co., Ltd.
v. Papst, 374 F. Supp. 2d 202, 215-16 (D.D.C. 2005).
120. 655 F. Supp. 2d 1036 (N.D. Cal. 2009).
121. 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
122. Id. at 623-24.
123. Id. at 624.
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components, the exhaustion issue turned on "the extent to
which a product must embody a patent in order to trigger
exhaustion." 124 Applying its earlier opinion in United States
v. Univis Lens Co.,' 2 5 the Court held that the chips in
question sufficiently embodied the patents because there was
"no reasonable use for the Intel Products other than
incorporating them into computer systems that practice the
LGE Patents." 26
The LG Electronics court's determination that Quanta
abrogated the Jazz Photo rule was based on inferences from
the Quanta opinion rather than any explicit statement to that
effect. The court noted that Quanta stated unequivocally that
"[tihe authorized sale of an article that substantially
embodies a patent exhausts the patent holder's rights,"'2 7
without qualifying its ruling by requiring that the sale take
place in the United States. It considered this lack of
qualification to be meaningful, inasmuch as there are
indications in the opinion that the Court "was aware that
some sales under the license agreement were made
overseas."128 More recently, in Fujifilm Corp. v. Benun,129 the
Federal Circuit flatly rejected the argument, advanced by
Jazz Photo in yet another appearance before that court in the
ongoing controversy, that in Quanta the Supreme Court had
effectively disapproved the Jazz Photo rule. The court held
that Quanta had no impact on its rule that a foreign sale does
not exhaust U.S. patent rights, inasmuch as the case did not
involve foreign sales.13 0
2. Evaluation of the Patent Cases in Light of the SingleReward Principle
The foregoing review of cases that have addressed patent
exhaustion when the first sale occurs outside the United
States yields several conclusions.
First, in most of the cases the results are consistent with
the single-reward principle. The consistent cases fall into two
124. Id. at 630.
125. 316 U.S. 241 (1942).
126. Quanta Computer, 553 U.S. at 632.
127. LG Electronics, Inc. v. Hitachi, Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1044 (N.D.
Cal. 2009) (quoting Quanta Computer, Inc., 553 U.S. at 638).
128. Id. at 1045.
129. 605 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
130. Id. at 1371.
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categories: (1) those which found patent rights exhausted,
based on a first sale abroad that resulted in a patent-based
reward to the patentee, either directly or through a licensee
or assignee, 13 and (2) those which found no exhaustion, based
on a first sale abroad that did not result in such a reward. 132
Second, several of the cases contain dictum statements
that are consistent with the single-reward principle. 13 3 Third,
several cases reach outcomes that are inconsistent with the
single-reward principle, namely Griffinl34 and the Jazz Photo
line of cases.' 35
3. Jazz Photo and Extraterritoriality
Given the Supreme Court's explicit and repeated
statement of the single-reward principle as the basis for the
doctrine of patent exhaustion, and the fact that multiple court
decisions have held that a U.S. patent may be exhausted by a
first sale that occurs abroad, why does the Federal Circuit, in
the Jazz Photo line of cases, hold that exhaustion can never
131. See, e.g., Curtiss Aeroplane & Motor Corp. v. United Aircraft Eng'g
Corp., 266 F. 71 (2d Cir. 1920); LG Electronics, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 2d 1036;
Kabushiki Kaisha Hattori Seiko v. Refac Tech. Dev. Corp., 690 F. Supp. 1339
(S.D.N.Y. 1988); Holiday v. Mattheson, 24 F. 185 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1885).
In Sanofi, S.A. v. Med-Tech Veterinarian Prods., Inc., 565 F. Supp. 931
(D.N.J. 1983), the court found exhaustion based on a foreign sale even though
the reward the seller received was not a patent-based reward. Had the article
been subject to a patent in the country where it was first sold, the court would
have found exhaustion a fortiori.
132. See, e.g., Boesch v. Graff, 133 U.S. 697 (1890); Daimler Mfg. Co. v.
Conklin, 170 F. 70 (2d Cir. 1909); PCI Parfums et Cosmetiques Int'l v.
Perfumania, Inc., 35 U.S.P.Q.2d 1159 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
133. Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. 183, 196 (1856) (if the gaff had been
manufactured on a ship in Boston harbor, rights of the U.S. patentee would
have been infringed); Dickerson v. Tinling, 84 F. 192, 194 (8th Cir. 1897)
(outcome depends on whether the first sale abroad was from the owner or
licensee of the U.S. patent); Dickerson v. Matheson, 57 F. 524 (2d Cir. 1893)
(same).
134. 453 F. Supp. 1283 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
135. Setting aside the single-reward principle and focusing on the location of
sale, a fair assessment of the cases is: "There is disagreement among the courts
whether sales abroad authorized by a U.S. patentee exhaust U.S. patent rights.
Ordinarily, when the sales are not with the patentee's authorization, the U.S.
Darren E. Donnelly, Parallel Trade and
rights are not exhausted."
International Harmonization of the Exhaustion of Rights Doctrine, 13 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 447, 454 (1997). Another commentator
described the pre-Jazz Photo cases as implementing a "modified international
rule of exhaustion," under which the patentee "could limit the application of the
international exhaustion rule only through express contractual language."
Erlikhman, supra note 115, at 312.
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result from a first sale abroad? The result of this holding is
that patentees are allowed to exact two patent-based rewards
from the sale and resale of a particular article, a violation of
the single-reward principle. 36
The answer is that the court thought this result was
compelled by the principle that the Patent Act does not have
extraterritorial effect. This idea is only latent in the first of
the Jazz Photo cases, suggested by the court's statement that
for exhaustion to occur the sale "must have occurred under
the United States patent."137 In the second of these cases, the
court spells out the idea explicitly: "Fuji's foreign sales can
never occur under a United States patent because the United
States patent system does not provide for extraterritorial
In addition, both opinions rely upon Boesch. 3 1
effect.""
That decision contains language-" [t]he sale of articles in the
United States under a United States patent cannot be
controlled by foreign laws"14 0 -which, taken out of context,
may be interpreted as implementing a rule against
extraterritorial application of national laws.
B. Copyright Exhaustion Cases with a Foreign Component
As the discussion above has shown, in patent cases the
international factor that is relevant to the question of
exhaustion is the location of the sale of the article. Thus, the
Jazz Photo cases hold that a sale of an article that occurs
outside the United States does not exhaust U.S. patent rights
with respect to that article while an authorized sale in the
United States does result in exhaustion. In the copyright
arena, two locational factors are potentially relevant to the
question of exhaustion: (1) location of the sale of the article,
and (2) location of its manufacture. The courts that have
136. The logic of these cases would seem to imply that a patentee cannot
receive more than a double reward through application of the U.S. patent laws.
By hypothesis the first sale of the article in the United States is an authorized
domestic sale, which exhausts the patent rights with respect to that article and
prevents the patentee from extracting a third patent-based reward.
137. Jazz Photo Corp. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 264 F.3d 1094, 1105 (Fed. Cir.
2001).
138. Fuji Photo Film Co., Ltd. v. Jazz Photo Corp., 394 F.3d 1368, 1376 (Fed.
Cir. 2005).
139. That is also true of the only pre-Jazz Photo case clearly holding that
exhaustion can never result from a first sale outside the United States: Griffin
v. Keystone Mushroom Farm, Inc., 453 F. Supp. 1283 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
140. Boesch v. Graff, 133 U.S. 697, 703 (1890).
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found the latter factor relevant rely on language from the
Copyright Act's first-sale rule providing that exhaustion
occurs in favor of the owner of "a particular copy or
phonorecord lawfully made under this title."14 ' Courts that
have found the location of sale relevant cannot point to
support in the text of the statute, but have relied on this
factor to avoid the absurd results that would otherwise flow
from holding that the copyright of an article manufactured
abroad can never be exhausted.
1. The Cases
a. Scorpio and the Ninth Circuit Quartet
The international copyright exhaustion cases have a
much shorter history than the international patent cases.
The first such case, Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
Scorpio Music Distributors,Inc.,142 was decided in 1983. In
manufactured
that case, Vicor Music Corporation
phonorecordsl 4 3 in the Philippines pursuant to authorization
from Columbia Broadcast System, the copyright owner of the
sound recordings that the phonorecords contained." Some of
these phonorecords made their way to the United States.
Scorpio Music Distributors, Inc. (a Pennsylvania corporation),
through its agentl 45 International Traders, Inc. (a Nevada
corporation), purchased the phonorecords from Rainbow
Music, Inc. (a Philippines corporation), which had purchased
them in the Philippines from Vicor.146 Thus Scorpio imported
phonorecords, containing sound recordings protected by U.S.
copyright, that had been the subject of a first sale outside the
United States. CBS sued Scorpio for its unauthorized
importation of the phonorecords, alleging a violation of § 602
of the Copyright Act.14 7 Scorpio invoked the first-sale rule as
141. 15 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
142. 569 F. Supp. 47 (E.D. Pa. 1983), affd mem., 738 F.2d 424 (3d Cir. 1984).
143. The court's opinion does not further describe them, but the phonorecords
in question were probably vinyl LPs, or perhaps cassette tapes.
144. Scorpio, 569 F. Supp. at 47.
145. The nature of the legal relationship between Scorpio and International
Traders was an issue in the case. Id. at 48-49. But it is not relevant to the
exhaustion issue.
146. Id. at 47.
147. "Importation into the United States, without the authority of the owner
of copyright under this title, of copies or phonorecords of a work that have been
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a defense, maintaining that a first sale extinguishes the
copyright owner's exclusive right over importation under
§ 602(a).14 8 The logic of Scorpio's argument, although not
spelled out in the court's opinion, runs as follows: § 602(a)
importation actionable as an
makes unauthorized
infringement of the exclusive right to distribute under
§ 106(3); a first sale extinguishes the copyright owner's
distribution right under § 106(3); therefore, a first sale
extinguishes the copyright owner's right to control
importation.
The court rejected Scorpio's first-sale defense, offering
two justifications. First, the court focused on the text of
§ 109(a) stating that exhaustion results from sale of a copy or
phonorecord that is "lawfully made under this title." It held
that the phonorecords in question, having been manufactured
in the Philippines, were not "lawfully made under" Title 17 of
the U.S. Code-that is, under the Copyright Act-because the
provision
grants first sale protection to the third party buyer of
copies which have been legally manufactured and sold
within the United States and not to purchasers of imports
such as are involved here. The protection afforded by the
United States Code does not extend beyond the borders of
this country unless the Code expressly states. 149
In other words, because the Copyright Act has no
extraterritorial application, 1 s0 an article manufactured
outside the United States cannot have been "lawfully made
Second, the court held that Scorpio's
under" the Act.
interpretation "would render § 602 virtually meaningless,"

since it would allow a U.S. importer to evade the copyright
owner's exclusive right to import by purchasing copyrighted

acquired outside the United States is an infringement of the exclusive right to
distribute copies or phonorecords under section 106, actionable under section
501." 17 U.S.C. § 602(a) (2006). A 2008 amendment redesignated this provision
as § 602(a)(1). Pub. L. No. 110-403, Title I, § 105(b), (c)(1) (2008).
148. Scorpio, 569 F. Supp. at 47.
149. Id.
150. See Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Comm. Co., 24 F.3d 1088, 1095-98
(9th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (determining that there are no grounds for deviating
from the "undisputed axiom" that the Copyright Act does not have
extraterritorial effect).
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articles from an intermediary rather than directly from the
copyright owner. 151
Thus, the court invoked the rule against extraterritorial
application of the Copyright Act as one of its two rationales
for finding that the first sale involved in this case did not
result in exhaustion of the copyright owner's exclusive right
to import. It is worth noting that the court in the passage
quoted above held that exhaustion occurs only with respect to
an article that is both "legally manufactured" and "sold" in
the United States. The latter requirement, however, finds no
arguable textual basis in § 109(a), which makes no reference
to the location of sale. The Supreme Court later repudiated
this requirement in Quality King Distributors v. L'anza
52
Research International.1
The court's second rationale,
finding that Scorpio's interpretation of the relationship
between § 109(a) and § 602 would render the latter "virtually
meaningless," would also be discountenanced by the Supreme
Court in the same case. However, the Scorpio court's
interpretation of "lawfully made under this title," as
excluding exhaustion with respect to an article that is
manufactured outside the United States, would prove to have
more staying power, serving as the foundation for an
influential quartet of Ninth Circuit cases.
In BMG Music v. Perez,153 the Ninth Circuit addressed a
situation in which the defendant, without the authorization of
the U.S. copyright owner, imported into the United States
sound recordings that were manufactured abroad. The court,
relying on Scorpio, held that "[tlhe words 'lawfully made
under this title' in § 109(a) grant first sale protection only to
copies legally made and sold in the United States."'54 The
court did not refer explicitly to Scorpio's extraterritoriality
rationale, but rather to that decision's second rationale:
"Scorpio's concern over the possibility of rendering
meaningless § 602 is justified and, for that reason, so is its
result." 55

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Scorpio, 569 F. Supp. at 49-50.
523 U.S. 135 (1998). See also discussion infra Part II.B.1.c.
952 F.2d 318 (9th Cir. 1991).
Id. at 319.
Id.
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In Parfums Givenchy, Inc. v. Drug Emporium, Inc.,"' the
copyrighted article was the box in which a French perfume
was packaged. Parfums Givenchy produced the boxes (and
the perfume) in France. A third party purchased the boxescum-perfume abroad and imported them into the United
States. The defendant, Drug Emporium, purchased the
merchandise from the third party in the United States and
offered it for sale at retail. The U.S. copyright owner, a
wholly owned subsidiary of Parfums Givenchy, sued Drug
Emporium for infringement under § 602(a). 5 The court held
that Drug Emporium was not entitled to a defense based on
the first sale of the boxes abroad, finding that "[tihe material
facts of this case are nearly identical to those in BMG
Music."158 While professing adherence to that decision,'"' the
court introduced an important modification that was
necessitated by the BMG Music court's failure to anticipate
an important question that arises from a common scenario:
what happens when the copyright owner manufactures (or
licenses another to manufacture) the copyrighted article
abroad, and then imports it into the United States and sells it
there? The occurrence of an authorized sale in the United
States does not alter the fact that the article was
manufactured abroad and, therefore, according to the
interpretation set forth in Scorpio and adopted in BMG
Music, was not "lawfully made under this title" for purposes
of § 109(a). Under that interpretation, the copyright owner's
public distribution right could never be exhausted, and one
who purchased the article through an authorized sale in the
United States could not resell or otherwise publically
distribute the article without the copyright owner's
permission. 6 0 The copyright owner would be able to shut
down the secondary market in these articles, making a neat
end-run around the first-sale rule that could not have been
contemplated by Congress. The court acknowledged that
"such a result would be untenable,"'' but because the
156. 38 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 1994).
157. Id. at 479.
158. Id. at 482.
159. Id. ("Whether or not we agree with their arguments, BMG Music is
binding authority in the 9th Circuit that can only be overturned through an en
banc hearing.").
160. Id. at 482 n.8.
161. Id.
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hypothesized scenario was not present in the case (since there
was no sale in the United States authorized by the copyright
owner) the revision has the status of dictum.
The third case in the series, Denbicare U.S.A. Inc. v. Toys
R Us, Inc.,16 2 required the court actually to apply the dictum
rule it had stated in Parfums Givenchy. The copyrighted item
was the packaging of 450,000 diapers, which were
manufactured in Hong Kong and brought into the United
States with the authorization of the copyright owner, DPI. As
the diapers sat in a foreign trade zone warehouse in San
Francisco, DPI filed for bankruptcy. One McCoy purchased
the copyright from the bankruptcy trustee, licensed it to a
newly formed company called Denbicare, and began
manufacturing and selling diapers. The bankruptcy court
then approved sale of the 450,000 diapers to another party
who, through an intermediary, sold about half of them to Toys
"R" Us ("Toys"). Toys then sold them in its stores. Denbicare
sued Toys for copyright infringement, based on Toys' public
distribution of the copyrighted packaging without Denbicare's
authorization. 163 Toys invoked the first-sale rule as its
defense, arguing that the authorized first sale of the
packaging in the United States exhausted Denbicare's public
The court
distribution right as to that merchandise.
recounted its holdings in BMG Music and Parfums Givenchy,
and relied on its dictum in the latter to hold that "§ 109
applies to copies made abroad only if the copies have been
sold in the United States by the copyright owner or with its
authority."164 Because, as the court held, the bankruptcy's
trustee's sale of the 450,000 diapers that were held in the
foreign trade zone was an authorized sale in the United
States, the sale resulted in exhaustion-even though the
copyrighted merchandise was manufactured abroad.
In the last of the Ninth Circuit quartet, Omega S.A. v.
Costco Wholesale Corp.,"'5 the court reaffirmed its holding in
Denbicare (presaged in Parfums Givenchy) that the first-sale
defense is available "only where the disputed copies of a
copyrighted work were either made or previously sold in the
162. 84 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 1996).
163. Id. at 1145-46.
164. Id. at 1150.
165. 541 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2008), affd by an equally divided Court, 131 S.
Ct. 565 (2010).
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United States with the authority of the copyright owner."' 66
The case involved watches that Omega manufactured in
Switzerland, each of which featured an engraved design that
was protected by U.S. copyright. Omega first sold the
watches to a distributor abroad. A third party purchased the
watches and sold them to an intermediary in the United
States, which sold them to Costco. Costco then offered the
watches for sale at retail in the United States. Omega sued
Costco, alleging infringement under §§ 106(3) and 602(a), and
Costco invoked the first-sale rule as a defense. The court
ruled in Omega's favor. This outcome followed directly from
the rules established in its prior triad of cases on this issue.
Under the general rule established in BMG Music, the firstsale defense was not available because the watches were not
"legally made . . . in the United States."' 7

The court

explicitly predicated this conclusion on its understanding that
a contrary holding would conflict with the undisputed
proposition that the Copyright Act does not apply
extraterritorially: "The basis for that rule was our concern
that applying § 109(a) to foreign-made copies would violate
the presumption against the extraterritorial application of
U.S. law."168 Additionally, the Parfums Givenchy exception
was unavailable because Costco's sale of the watches in the
United States was "without Omega's authority."'
The court devoted the remainder of its opinion to
addressing and rejecting Costco's contention that the BMG
Music rule had been effectively invalidated by the Supreme
Court's intervening decision in Quality King Distributors,Inc.
v. L'anza Research International, Inc.170
In that case,
owner's
copyright
the
that
held
Court
the
discussed below,
public distribution right was exhausted with respect to an
article that was manufactured in the United States and first
sold with the copyright owner's authorization abroad.
Costco's argument proceeded as follows: (1) In Quality King
the Court held that exhaustion could be triggered by a sale
occurring abroad; (2) The Court explained that such a rule
166. Id. at 983.
167. Id. at 987 (omission in original) (quoting BMG Music v. Perez, 952 F.2d
318, 319 (9th Cir. 1991)).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 986.
170. 523 U.S. 135 (1998).
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does not violate the principle that the Copyright Act has no
extraterritorial application: "Such protection does not require
the extraterritorial application of the Act any more than
§ 602(a)'s 'acquired abroad' language does";17 and (3) Finding
exhaustion based on sale of an article that was manufactured
abroad likewise would not violate the principle against
However, the argument was
extraterritorial application.
unavailing because the court rejected step three of the
syllogism, explaining:
[T]he application of § 109(a) to foreign-made copies would
impermissibly apply the Copyright Act extraterritorially
in a way that the application of the statute after foreign
sales does not. Under the latter application, the statute
merely acknowledges the occurrence of a foreign event as
a relevant fact. The former application would go much
further. To characterize the making of copies overseas as
"lawful[ ] ... under [Title 17]" would be to ascribe legality
under the Copyright Act to conduct that occurs entirely
outside the United States, notwithstanding the absence of
a clear expression of congressional intent in favor of
extraterritoriality.172
Several district courts, both inside and outside the Ninth
Circuit, have followed the quartet cases in holding that the
sale abroad of a foreign-made copy does not exhaust the
copyright owner's importation or public distribution rights.173
The Ninth Circuit's position, based on the above quartet
of cases, can therefore be summarized as follows:
* If a copy or phonorecord protected by U.S. copyright is
manufactured abroad, no exhaustion results from a
first (or subsequent) sale abroad. To hold otherwise
would be tantamount to according the Copyright Act
extraterritorial application since § 109(a) allows for
exhaustion only with respect to an item that is
171. Id. at 145 n.14.
172. Omega S.A., 541 F.3d at 988.
173. See Microsoft Corp. v. Big Boy Distrib. L.L.C., 589 F. Supp. 2d 1308,
1316-17 (S.D. Fla. 2008); Microsoft Corp. v. Intrax Group, Inc., No. C 07-1840
CW, 2008 WL 4500703, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2008); Microsoft Corp. v.
Cietdirect.com L.L.C., No. 08-60668-CIV, 2008 WL 3162535, at *5 (S.D. Fla.
Aug. 5, 2008); Swatch S.A. v. New City, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1254 (S.D.
Fla. 2006); UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Norwalk Distrib., Inc., No. SACV 02-1188
DOC, 2003 WL 22722410, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 13, 2003); Lingo Corp. v.
Topix, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 2863(RMB), 2003 WL 223454, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 31,
2003).
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"lawfully made under" the Act, and an item that is
made abroad can be made under the Act only if the Act
has force in that foreign territory.
* Under the Parfums Givenchy exception, an authorized
domestic sale of such a foreign-made item does result in
exhaustion. To hold otherwise would lead to the
untenable result that the copyright owner would retain
an inexhaustible distribution right with respect to a
foreign-made copy or phonorecord no matter how many
times it changed hands.
The second rule is inconsistent with the first because the
occurrence of a domestic sale does not alter the fact that the
article was manufactured abroad. The Ninth Circuit has not
sought to reconcile the two rules.'7 4
The Ninth Circuit's resolution of the issues fails to accord
with the single-reward principle under at least one common
scenario. Consider the case of a copyrighted textbook that is
manufactured in China. If the publisher sells the book
initially to a purchaser in China, or in any other country
except the United States, it receives a copyright-based reward
from that transaction. 1 5 Because no exhaustion of the book's
U.S. copyright results from that sale, the publisher (assuming
it is the copyright owner) retains the exclusive right to control
import of the book into the United States. This allows the
publisher to extract a second royalty from the importer, as
well as a third royalty if the importer should seek to resell the
book in the United States. Under a slightly different
scenario, however, the single-reward principle is observed. If
the publisher initially sells the book to a distributor or end
user in the United States, then exhaustion results due to the
Parfums Givenchy exception.
Contrast a situation where the book is manufactured in
the United States. In that case, the single-reward principle is
observed regardless of where the first sale occurs. If the book
is first sold in the United States, then we have a purely
domestic scenario and the sale results in exhaustion. If the
book is first sold abroad, we have the scenario presented in
174. See Samuel Brooks, Battling Gray Markets Through Copyright Law:
Omega, S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 19, 23.
175. Because nearly all economically significant countries are signatories to
the Berne Convention or TRIPS, the book, if original, is likely to be protected
under the copyright law of the country in which the sale occurs.
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Quality King, in which the Court held that the sale outside
the United States results in exhaustion.
b. The Third Circuit'sDivergent View: Sebastian
Another early case that helped to frame this debate is the
Third Circuit's decision in Sebastian International, Inc. v.
Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd. 176 In that case the copyrighted
article consisted of the label on bottles of hair-care products
17
Sebastian
that were manufactured in the United States."
shipped containers of its products carrying the labels to a
distributor in South Africa, which shipped them back to the
United States, and Sebastian sued to prevent their
distribution. 7 8 The court held that the first-sale rule limits
the importation right-that is, § 109(a) limits the copyright
owner's rights under § 602(a). 79 The court further held that
a first sale results in exhaustion regardless of whether it
occurs within the United States or abroad.
In arriving at this interpretation the court stated, and
chiefly relied upon, the single-reward principle. Explaining
the economic justification of the first-sale rule, the court
reasoned that "the ultimate question under the 'first sale'
doctrine is whether or not there has been such a disposition of
the copyrighted article that it may fairly be said that the
copyright proprietor has received his reward for its use."180
Applying this principle to the facts before it, the court
observed that when Sebastian voluntarily sold its product to
the South African distributor it "received its reward through
the

purchase price."'

Allowing

Sebastian to control

importation of those copies would violate the single-reward
principle. On this point, the court explained:
Nothing in the wording of section 109(a), its history or
philosophy, suggests that the owner of copies who sells

them abroad does not receive a "reward for his work." Nor

does the language of section 602(a) intimate that a
copyright owner who elects to sell copies abroad should
receive "a more adequate award" than those who sell
176. 847 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1988).
177. Id. at 1094.
178. Id. at 1094-95.
179. Id. at 1095.
180. Id. at 1096-97 (quoting Burke & Van Heusen, Inc. v. Arrow Drug, Inc.,
233 F. Supp. 881, 884 (E.D. Pa. 1964)).
181. Id. at 1099.

20111

EXHAUSTING EXTRATERRITORIALITY

1225

domestically. That result would occur if the holder were
to receive not only the purchase price, but a right to limit
importation as well.182
c. Quality King and its progeny
In Quality King,' the copyrighted article was the label
on bottles of shampoo and other hair-care products. L'anza
manufactured the labeled bottles in the United States, and
sold them to a distributor abroad. Quality King purchased
the bottles from the overseas distributor, imported them into
the United States, and sold them to retailers, which in turn
sold them to end users. 184 L'anza sued Quality King, alleging
infringement of its exclusive rights to import and publicly
distribute the bottles, and Quality King invoked the first-sale
rule as a defense. 8 5
The Court held that the first-sale rule of § 109(a) does in
fact limit the copyright owner's importation right under
§ 602(a), and that Quality King was therefore entitled to the
In so doing, the Court rejected the
first-sale defense."'
rationale advanced by Scorpio, and adopted intermittently by
the Ninth Circuit in its quartet of cases, 8 1 that such an

182. Id. Another pre-Quality King case, Summit Tech., Inc. v. High-Line
Med. Instruments Co., Inc., 922 F. Supp. 299, 315 (C.D. Cal. 1996), followed
Sebastian in holding that a first sale abroad exhausts the copyright of an article
manufactured in the United States. It likewise invoked the single-reward
principle: "Summit made the 'first sale,' and therefore received its 'reward' for
its work." Id.
183. 523 U.S. 135 (1998).
184. Id. at 138-39.
185. Id. at 140.
186. The Ninth Circuit's decision below held to the contrary. L'anza
Research Int'l, Inc. v. Quality King Distrib., Inc., 98 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 1996),
rev'd, 523 U.S. 135 (1998). In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit repudiated the
rationale based on the principle against extraterritorial application of the
Copyright Act, which it had relied upon in its prior cases. Id. at 1115. Twelve
years later, in Omega v. Costco, as discussed above, the court revived its
adherence to that rationale, making no effort to explain its inconstancy. Omega
S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 541 F.3d 982, 988 (9th Cir. 2008), affd by an
equally divided Court, 131 S. Ct. 565 (2010).
187. See BMG Music v. Perez, 952 F.2d 318, 319 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Scorpio's
concern over the possibility of rendering meaningless § 602 is justified and, for
that reason, so is its result."); Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Scorpio Music
Distrib., Inc., 569 F. Supp. 47, 49 (E.D. Pa. 1983) ("Construing § 109(a) as
superseding the prohibition on importation set forth in the more recently
enacted § 602 would render § 602 virtually meaningless."), affd mem., 738 F.2d
424 (3d Cir. 1984).
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interpretation would render § 602(a) meaningless. Instead,
the Court adopted the position that the Third Circuit had
taken in Sebastian ten years earlier.18 8 The Court explained
that even when limited by the first-sale rule, the import right
of § 602(a) would be effective in several situations, including
where the copyright owner authorized copies to be
manufactured abroad but wished to prevent their importation
into the United States. In the course of its discussion, the
Court at several points suggested that it agreed with the first
Scorpio rationale, that "lawfully made under this title" means
made with the copyright owner's authorization in the United
States. In its most explicit statement of this idea, the Court
hypothesized a situation in which an author conveys the right
to distribute copies in the United States to one publisher and
the right to distribute copies in Britain to another publisher.
In such a situation, the Court said, "presumably only those
[copies] made by the publisher of the United States edition
would be 'lawfully made under this title' within the meaning
of § 109(a)."s 9
The Court did not disclose the basis for this construction
of "lawfully made under this title."
However, Justice
Ginsburg, in her brief concurring statement, was more
forthcoming. She wrote to express her view that the outcome
might be different in a case where the copyrighted article was
manufactured abroad. In explanation of her position, she
cited a commentator for the proposition that "provisions of
Title 17 do not apply extraterritorially unless expressly so
stated, hence the words 'lawfully made under this title' in the
'first sale' provision, 17 U.S.C. § 109(a), must mean 'lawfully
made in the United States."' 90 Thus, Justice Ginsburg, like
the Scorpio court, expressed the view that to hold that an
article made outside the United States can be made "under"
the Copyright Act would be to violate the principle that the
Act does not apply extraterritorially. Given that the other
Justices saw no need to explain the basis for their own
identical interpretation of "lawfully made under this title,"
188. The Court's rejection of this rationale means that the only remaining
justification for the Ninth Circuit quartet of cases is the rule against
extraterritorial application of the Copyright Act. Brooks, supra note 174, at 21.
189. Quality King, 523 U.S. at 148.
190. Id. at 154 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (citing W. PATRY, COPYRIGHT LAW
AND PRACTICE 166-70 (1997 Supp.)).
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and that none stated disagreement with Justice Ginsburg's
explanation, it seems reasonable to infer that they too
believed that a contrary reading would conflict with the
principle against extraterritorial application.
The Court's statement in Quality King that copies
manufactured in England and licensed for sale only in
England are not "lawfully made under" the Copyright Act is
dictum, because the case before it involved an article (the
shampoo bottle labels) manufactured within the United
States. However, several subsequent district court decisions,
some without exhibiting great enthusiasm, have adhered to
that dictum, interpreting it as meaning that a copy
manufactured outside the United States cannot be "lawfully
made under" the Act."19 For example, in Pearson Education,
Inc. v. Liu,'92 the court considered the decisions of prior
courts, addressed the issue independently, and concluded
"provisionally . . . that nothing in § 109(a) or the history,
purposes, and policies of the first-sale doctrine, limits the
doctrine to copies of a work manufactured in the United
States."19 3 The court felt bound, however, by the Quality
King dictum: "When the Supreme Court addresses an
unsettled question of federal law in unanimous dicta, respect
for the Supreme Court as an institution and the dedicated
jurists who serve on it mandates deference in all but the most
exceptional circumstances."194 The court accordingly held,
"dubitante,that the first-sale doctrine does not apply to copies
of a copyrighted work manufactured abroad."195
191. That interpretation of the dictum is not inevitable. The Court might
have meant, for example, that the copies are not "lawfully made" under the
Copyright Act because they are not licensed for distribution in the United
States, the territory where the Act is effective. See Brooks, supra note 174, at
31-32.
192. 656 F. Supp. 2d 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2009), appeal filed.
193. Id. at 415.
194. Id. at 416.
195. Id. Other courts have followed the Quality King dictum. See, e.g.,
Pearson Educ., Inc. v. Kumar, 721 F. Supp. 2d 166, 178 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
("[When the Supreme Court directly addresses [a] question in unanimous
language, albeit dicta, deference must be paid by district courts . . . ."); John

Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, No. 08 Civ. 7834 (DCP), 2009 WL 3364037, at
*9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2009) ("[T]he Supreme Court's unambiguous language,
though dicta, is sufficient to resolve the uncertainties in interpreting the Act."),
appeal filed; Pearson Educ., Inc. v. Liao, No. 07-Civ-2423 (SHS), 2008 WL
2073491, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2008) (citing the dictum); Swatch S.A. v. New
City, Inc., 454 F. Supp. 2d 1245, 1254 (S.D. Fla. 2006) ("[Tlhe first sale
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2. Evaluation of the Copyright Cases in Light of the
Single-Reward Principle
Most of the cases involving a copyrighted article that was
manufactured abroad are inconsistent with the single-reward
principle. These fall within two lines of authority. The first
consists of the line beginning with Scorpio, including the
Ninth Circuit quartet of cases as well as district court cases
from several circuits, which find the Ninth Circuit cases to be
The second line
controlling or persuasive authority. 196
includes those courts that have heeded the Supreme Court's
dictum in Quality King, concluding that it required the
conclusion that an article manufactured abroad is not subject
to exhaustion through a first sale.'
In both lines of cases,
the courts considered that this result was compelled by the
principle that the Copyright Act does not apply
extraterritorially.
By contrast, in cases involving an article that was
manufactured in the United States but first sold abroad,
Quality King has established a rule that is consistent with
the single-reward principle, according to which the initial sale
results in exhaustion.
III. EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND APPLICATION OF THE
EXHAUSTION DOCTRINE TO ARTICLES SOLD OR
MANUFACTURED ABROAD

As the foregoing discussion has shown, leading cases
have held that rights granted under the patent and copyright
laws are not exhausted by a first sale in a situation involving
a particular type of foreign component. In patent cases, the
Federal Circuit has held that patent rights are not exhausted
by an authorized first sale that occurs outside the United
States. In copyright cases, the Ninth Circuit has determined
that the public distribution right is not exhausted by an
authorized first sale outside the United States of an article
that was manufactured outside the United States. In both
sets of cases, the courts justify their holdings on the ground
protection of § 109(a) applies only to copies first sold in the United States-not
to those manufactured and first sold abroad."); UMG Recordings, Inc. v.
Norwalk Distrib., Inc., No. SACV 02-1188 DOC, 2003 WL 22722410, at *4 (C.D.
Cal. Mar. 13, 2003).
196. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.a.
197. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.c.
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that to hold otherwise would be to apply the patent or
copyright laws extraterritorially, which all agree is contrary
to Congress's intent and, therefore, impermissible.
This justification is not well founded. As this Part
argues, the rule against extraterritorial application of the
patent and copyright laws does not compel the conclusion
that a first sale involving a certain type of foreign element
cannot result in exhaustion. This conclusion is based on a
misunderstanding of what constitutes extraterritorial
application of the laws. Finding exhaustion of intellectual
property rights in such situations does not amount to
extraterritorial application of the patent or copyright laws.
A. The PresumptionAgainst ExtraterritorialApplication of
U.S. Laws
Interpreting the patent and copyright laws so that
exhaustion results from a first sale occurring outside the
United States would not be an extraterritorial application of
the laws because such an interpretation implicates none of
the policy concerns that underlie the judicial presumption
that U.S. laws do not have extraterritorial effect.
In determining whether a federal statute applies to
conduct occurring outside the United States, the courts apply
a rule of construction consisting of a presumption against
extraterritoriality. The presumption is usually traced back to
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 198 where the
plaintiff, a U.S. corporation, brought an action under the
Sherman Antitrust Act against another U.S. corporation
based on defendant's allegedly anticompetitive conduct
abroad. Plaintiffs claim was that defendant had "instigated"
Costa Rican authorities (then administering the territory on
which plaintiffs banana plantation was situated in Panama)
to seize its plantation as part of a plot to monopolize the
banana trade.199 Although the Act includes no geographical
limitations, applying literally to "every contract in restraint of
trade" and "every person who shall monopolize," the Court
held that Congress did not intend that it be applied to
conduct that occurs in Panama. 2 00 The rule of construction to
198. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
199. Id. at 354-55.
200. Id. at 357.
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be applied "in case of doubt," the Court held, is that a statute
is "intended to be confined in its operation and effect to the
territorial limits over which the lawmaker has general and
legitimate power."2 01 A contrary construction would conflict
with "the general and almost universal rule . . . that the

character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined
wholly by the law of the country where the act is done."2 02 In
support of that rule, the Court cited two considerations:
applying one sovereign's law to conduct occurring within the
territory of another sovereign (1) "would be unjust,"0 and (2)
would be "an interference with the authority of another
sovereign, contrary to the comity of nations, which the other
state concerned justly might resent."204
2 05 where the Court
In Foley Brothers., Inc. v. Filardo,
20 6
held that the Eight Hour Law does not apply to employers
in foreign countries under contract with the U.S. government,
the Court stated another justification for the presumption: "It
is based on the assumption that Congress is primarily
concerned with domestic conditions."207

201. Id.
202. Id. at 356.
203. The Court does not say why it would be unjust. One might think it
unjust on the ground that a person is entitled to assume he will not be subject
to sanctions for engaging in conduct that is lawful where he is located.
Alternatively, it might be thought unjust because it is inconsistent with the
basic democratic principle that "government must rest upon the consent of the
governed." Austen Parrish, The Effects Test: Extraterritoriality'sFifth Business,
61 VAND. L. REV. 1455, 1483 (2008).
204. Am. Banana Co., 213 U.S. at 356. See Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale:
ExtraterritorialApplication of American Law, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 179, 193 (the
traditional principle that a sovereign's laws apply only to conduct occurring
within its territory is designed to prevent "conflicts with foreign nations that
cause[] tension in international relations"). The courts have applied this
presumption against extraterritorial effect to a number of other statutes,
including labor laws and environmental protection laws. See Curtis A. Bradley,
TerritorialIntellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 VA. J. INTL L.
505, 512 (1997).
205. 336 U.S. 281, 285 (1949).
206. This was a federal law requiring time-and-a-half pay for more than
eight hours of work in a day performed under a contract to which the United
States is a party. Id. at 282-83.
207. Id. See also Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993) ("[T]he
presumption is rooted in a number of considerations, not the least of which is
the commonsense notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic
concerns in mind.").
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In E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co., 20 8 in which the
plaintiff sought application of Title VII to the conduct of his
former employer-a Delaware corporation, operating in Saudi
Arabia-the Court reaffirmed the presumption stated in
American Banana: "It is a longstanding principle of American
law 'that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent
appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States." 2 09 The presumption may
be overcome only by "'the affirmative intention of the
Congress clearly expressed."'2 10 The Court explained that
this rule "serves to protect against unintended clashes
between our laws and those of other nations which could
result in international discord."21 1 The Court also declined to
interpret Title VII in such a way that its reach could not be
limited to U.S. corporations operating overseas, but would
also apply to the conduct of foreign employers. The Court
explained that it was "unwilling to ascribe to [Congress] a
policy which would raise difficult issues of international law
208. 499 U.S. 244 (1991).
209. Id. at 248 (quoting Foley Bros., 336 U.S. at 281, 285). The Foley Court
was itself paraphrasing the statement quoted above from Am. Banana, 213 U.S.
at 356. See supra text accompanying note 204.
210. Arabian Am. Oil, 499 U.S. at 248 (quoting Benz v. Compania Naviera
Hidalgo, S.A., 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957)). The Court lists several statutes that
express such an intention. Id. at 258-59. As the Court has pointed out, the
rule against extraterritorial application of statutes is a rule of construction only,
not a limitation on Congress's power: as a matter of both U.S. and international
law, "Congress has the authority to enforce its laws beyond the territorial
boundaries of the United States." Id. at 248. And courts regularly apply U.S.
law to conduct occurring abroad on the basis of the "effects test." See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402(1)(c) (1987) ("[A]
state has jurisdiction to prescribe law with respect to . . . conduct outside its
territory that has or is intended to have substantial effect within its
territory. .. ."); Bradley, supra note 204, at 517 ("[Tlhere is now substantial

agreement that nations may, under certain circumstances, regulate
extraterritorial conduct that has effects within their territory . . . .").
211. Arabian Am. Oil, 499 U.S. at 248. As the Ninth Circuit has explained,
this consideration applies with particular force in the context of the treaty
The Berne
system that structures the international copyright regime.
Convention, which the United States joined in 1988, is built upon the
foundation of "national treatment," according to which infringements are
generally to be remedied under the law of, and in the courts of, the country
where the infringement occurs. For the United States to apply its law to
infringement occurring in the territory of another treaty party "would be
contrary to the spirit of the Berne Convention, and might offend other member
nations by effectively displacing their law in circumstances in which previously
it was assumed to govern." Subafilms, Ltd. v. MGM-Pathe Comm. Co., 24 F.3d
1088, 1097 (9th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
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by imposing this country's employment-discrimination regime
upon foreign corporations operating in foreign commerce."212
The Court's most recent treatment of the presumption
against extraterritorial application of U.S. laws, Morrison v.
National Australia Bank Ltd.,213 reiterates its earlier
justifications of the presumption, namely that "Congress
ordinarily legislates with respect to domestic, not foreign
matters" and that it avoids legislating in a way that creates
"incompatibility with the applicable laws of other
countries."2 14
We may derive from these cases that the presumption
against extraterritorial application of U.S. laws is premised
on the assumption that Congress, unless it explicitly
indicates a contrary intention, intends that its legislation
should be applied in such a way that it: (1) addresses
domestic concerns; (2) respects the comity of nations by not
interfering with the legislative prerogatives of other
sovereigns; and (3) avoids unjustly penalizing a person for
conduct that is consistent with the law of the territory where
the conduct occurs.2 15
Interpreting the intellectual property laws so that a sale
occurring outside the United States exhausts patent or
copyright rights does not implicate any of these concerns.
First, interpreting the laws in this way would not divert their
attention from domestic concerns.
Cases presenting an
international exhaustion issue arise when a person seeks to
import into the United States, or distribute, vend, or use
within the United States, an article that is protected by a
U.S. patent or copyright. If the claimant (i.e., the party
invoking the U.S. intellectual property laws) is successful, the
result is a decision that prevents such disposition of a
copyrighted or patented article in the United States. If
unsuccessful, the consequence is that such disposition is
212. Arabian Am. Oil, 499 U.S. at 255. The "difficult issues" would arise
from the possibility that an attempt to apply U.S. law in such circumstances
would violate customary international law, which "imposes some limitations on
the authority of nations to apply their laws to persons or activities outside their
borders." Bradley, supra note 204, at 514.
213. 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
214. Id. at 2877, 2885.
215. See Browne C. Lewis, It's a Small World After All: Making the Case for
the ExtraterritorialApplication of the National Environmental Policy Act, 25
CARDOZO L. REV. 2143, 2183-84 (2004).
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permitted. The concerns of the parties and the court, and the
impact of the law, are purely domestic. The court's decision
does not speak in any way to the legality of any action
occurring outside the United States.
Second, allowing a foreign sale to exhaust patent or
copyright rights would not interfere with the legitimate
interests of any other sovereign and would not impinge on the
comity of nations. There is no resulting regulation of the
conduct of any person occurring outside the United States.
Enforcement of the exhaustion doctrine by a U.S. court does
not prevent any person from selling any patented or
copyrighted article outside the United States. Indeed, a
determination by a U.S. court that exhaustion results from a
sale abroad has, if anything, a deregulatoryimpact on persons
located outside the United States because it results in a
holding that the patent or copyright owner has no right to
control importation of the article into the United States.
Third, as is clear from the discussion of the first two
considerations, applying the exhaustion rules to a sale
occurring overseas will not result in unfairness to any person.
The result of such an application is to reduce the constraints
on the conduct of those dealing with a patented or
copyrighted article by limiting the prerogatives of the rights
owner.
B. Extraterritorialityas Regulation of ConductAbroad
Interpreting the intellectual property laws to provide for
exhaustion based on a sale occurring abroad would not give
those laws extraterritorial effect because the result would not
be to regulate any conduct occurring outside the United
In most cases that involve a question of
States.
extraterritorial application of U.S. laws, the issue is whether
Congress intends a law to extend to conduct beyond the
borders of the United States in a situation where it is clear
that the party invoking the law seeks an extraterritorial
application of it. A few cases have addressed the logically
prior question of whether a particular application of a U.S.
law amounts to an extraterritorial one. These courts have
indicated that the touchstone of whether an application of law
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is extraterritorial is whether it regulates conduct occurring in
another country.216

Thus, in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Massey,2 17
the plaintiff sought a determination that the National Science
Foundation violated the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA") by failing to prepare an environmental impact
statement before constructing an incinerator at a research
station in Antarctica. The court rejected the defense that
NEPA was inapplicable because it has no extraterritorial
effect. It did so not on the ground that the statute does have
extraterritorial reach, but rather through a determination
that application of NEPA under these circumstances would
not be an extraterritorial one. The court explained:
By definition, an extraterritorial application of a statute
involves the regulation of conduct beyond U.S. borders.
Even where the significant effects of the regulated conduct
are felt outside U.S. borders, the statute itself does not
present a problem of extraterritoriality, so long as the
conduct which Congress seeks to regulate occurs largely
within the United States.218

216. Other definitions of "extraterritorial application" have been advanced,
but are not useful for present purposes. See, e.g., Kollias v. D & G Marine
Maint., 29 F.3d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1994) ("extraterritorially" means "beyond the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States"); Bradley, supra note 204, at 506
n.1 ("application of a nation's laws to conduct occurring outside of the nation's
territory"); Jane C. Ginsburg, Extraterritoriality and Multiterritoriality in
588
(1997)
Copyright Infringement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 587,
("Extraterritoriality . .. means the application of one country's laws to events
occurring outside that country's borders."); Parrish, supra note 203, at 1456 n.2
("A law is extraterritorial when a court applies a domestic law to foreigners for
conduct occurring beyond the territorial borders of the nation-state in which the
court sits."); Jonathan Turley, "When in Rome": Multinational Misconduct and
the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality,84 Nw. U. L. REV. 598, 599 n.6
(1990) ("'[E]xtraterritoriality' refers to the operation of a United States law
outside the borders of the country so as to encompass actions or activities that
occur in whole or in part on the territory of another sovereign power . . . .").
These definitions are unhelpful because they leave unanswered the crucial
questions: Does taking account of an action occurring abroad in determining
how U.S. laws apply to conduct occurring in the United States amount to
"application" of U.S law to events occurring outside the United States? If a
foreigner engaged in the overseas conduct, does taking account of the conduct
amount to "applying" U.S. law to foreigners? Does it amount to "operation" of
U.S. law abroad?
217. 986 F.2d 528 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
218. Id. at 531. See also Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World
Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 921 (D.C. Cir. 1984) ("Territoriality-based
jurisdiction ... allows states to regulate the conduct or status of individuals or
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In this case, if plaintiffs achieved the relief they sought,
the result would be an order requiring federal government
officials, who are located "almost exclusively" in the United
States, to engage in deliberations and prepare a report. The
conduct that NEPA "regulates" is therefore purely domestic.
While application of NEPA to decisionmakers in Washington,
D.C. might ultimately have an impact outside the United
States, such as by resulting in a decision not to build an
incinerator in Antarctica, that effect does not constitute
"regulation" of extraterritorial conduct.21 9
The Ninth Circuit followed a similar line of reasoning in
Blazevska v. Raytheon Aircraft Co.220 There, the plaintiffs
(survivors of several residents of Macedonia who were killed
in a plane crash in Bosnia) brought a wrongful death action
against Raytheon, the manufacture of the plane. 221 The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendants
relying on the General Aviation Revitalization Act ("GARA"),
"a statute of repose that limits aircraft manufacturers'
liability to eighteen years after an aircraft is delivered." 2 22
against
presumption
the
that
argued
Plaintiffs
extraterritorial application of U.S. laws required a holding
that GARA was not applicable to this action because it
involved a plane crash that occurred in a foreign country.
The court disagreed. It began its analysis by noting that
"[s]imply because a case's factual background involves some
conduct occurring abroad does not mean that every statute
property physically situated within the territory, even if the effects of the
conduct are felt outside the territory."); Kramer, supra note 204, at 181 ("The
presumption against extraterritoriality . . . refers to a presumption that laws
regulate only acts occurring within the United States.").
219. A case involving another environmental statute, the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), goes
perhaps a step further in holding that application of a statute in a multinational
context does not involve extraterritoriality. In Pakootas v. Teck Cominco
Metals, Ltd., 452 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2006), the court held that an order issued
pursuant to CERCLA by the Environmental Protection Agency, requiring a
Canadian mining company to conduct a remediation study of a site located in
the United States that was polluted by the company's releases of hazardous
substances into the Columbia River in Canada, did not constitute an
extraterritorial application of U.S. law since the polluted site was located in the
United States-despite the fact that the order demanded certain action by a
Canadian corporation based on its activities in Canada.
220. 522 F.3d 948 (2008).
221. Id. at 950.
222. Id. at 951.
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governing the matter is subject to the presumption against
extraterritoriality; a court must first inquire into whether
of
issue
any
implicates
statute
a
applying
extraterritoriality." 2 3 Doing so "requires considering the
conduct the statute seeks to regulate."2 24 GARA, the court
found, regulates no conduct occurring outside the United
States: "The only conduct it could arguably be said to regulate
is the ability of a party to initiate an action for damages
against a manufacturer in American courts-an entirely
domestic endeavor."2 25
The analogy of the situation presented in Blazeuska v.
Raytheon to the issue under consideration-whether
interpreting the patent and copyright laws so that exhaustion
results from a first sale occurring outside the United States
amounts to extraterritorial application of the laws-is a very
close one. In both situations there is relevant conduct
occurring abroad. And in both situations "the conduct the
statute seeks to regulate" is the conduct of a U.S. court,
deciding a case presented to it. In both situations, if the
statute is found to be applicable the result is that a plaintiff
bringing a claim before a U.S. court is denied the relief
sought. Neither case involves any regulation of conduct
abroad: GARA does not regulate the conduct of airplane pilots
in the Balkins any more than the intellectual property laws
regulate the conduct of sellers abroad of articles protected by
U.S. patent or copyright.
In contrast, the cases in which courts have considered an
application of U.S law to be extraterritorial have involved
penalizing, or otherwise regulating, the conduct of a person
located outside the United States. In American Banana,
interpreting the antitrust laws as plaintiff sought would have
resulted in an order from a U.S. court requiring the defendant
to pay damages arising from its conduct in Panama.2 26 In
Foley Brothers, applying the Eight Hour Law would have
required employers in Iraq and Iran to pay time-and-a-half
for overtime work.2 27 In Arabian American Oil Co., an
employer in Saudi Arabia would have had to pay damages to
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

Id. at 952.
Id.
Id. at 953.
Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 353 (1909).
Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 283 (1949).
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or reinstate a discharged worker.2 28 In Smith, the United
States would have had to pay damages arising from its
negligent conduct in Antarctica.2 29 And in Morrison, an
Australian Bank would have been sanctioned for conduct in
connection with offerings on the Australian Stock Exchange
deemed fraudulent under the U.S. securities laws.230
C. Other Applications of the Patentand Copyright laws in
MultinationalContexts
In contexts not involving exhaustion, courts have applied
the patent and copyright laws so as to take account of conduct
occurring abroad without raising any concerns about
extraterritorial application of the laws-further confirmation
that allowing exhaustion based on conduct abroad would not
call for extraterritorial application.
First, the courts have held that both the patent231 and
the copyright2 32 laws reach conduct abroad that contributes in
some way to infringement that occurs within the United
States. Second, courts have allowed damages in infringement
actions to be based on conduct occurring abroad. Thus,
several courts have held that where acts infringing copyright
occurred in the United States, recoverable damages include

228. E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 247 (1991).
229. Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 199 (1993).
230. Morrison v. Nat'1 Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2876 (2010). See the
discussion of these and other cases in Blazevska v. Raytheon Aircraft Co., 522
F.3d 948, 954 (2008).
Salzer
&
Schubert
v.
Suessen-Schurr
Spindelfabrik
231. See
Maschinenfabrik Aktiengesellschaft, 903 F.2d 1568, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(injunction applying to machines manufactured overseas that are "destined for
delivery to the United States" is "not a prohibited extra-territorial application of
American patent law"); Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke, 509 F.2d 1137,
1141 (7th Cir. 1975) ("[A]lthough the patent laws of the United States do not
have extra-territorial effect, 'active inducement' may be found in events outside
the United States if they result in a direct infringement here . . . ."); Bradley,

supra note 204, at 522-23; Donald S. Chisum, Normative and Empirical
Territorialityin Intellectual Property: Lessons from Patent Law, 37 VA. J. INT'L
L. 603, 615 (1997) ("Court decisions have held foreign manufacturers who sold
products that were later resold or used in the United States liable as
contributory infringers under section 271(c), even though the manufacturer's
acts took place entirely outside the United States.").
232. See Cable/Home Commc'n Corp. v. Network Prod., Inc., 902 F.2d 829,
845-47 (11th Cir. 1990) (defendant's participation in a "descrambling summit"
held outside the United States constitutes contributory infringement); Bradley,
supra note 204, at 525-26.
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those arising from unauthorized use of copies overseas.23 3
Courts have likewise held that profits resulting from foreign
sales are recoverable as patent damages. 234
CONCLUSION
In domestic contexts, courts called upon to apply the
exhaustion doctrine as a limitation on rights conferred by the
patent and copyright laws have uniformly adhered, explicitly
or (more usually) implicitly, to the single-reward principle.
Once a rights owner has authorized the sale of an article
embodying his protected intellectual property, he has earned
the full reward to which the laws entitle him with respect to
that article, and he can no longer control the sale or use (in
the case of patent) or the public distribution (in the case of
copyright) of that article. In international contexts, however,
the courts in several influential decisions have found that
exhaustion does not result from an authorized sale that
occurs abroad. These decisions mean that the rights owner
can receive a double reward attributed to sale and resale of a
single article. In both patent and copyright cases, the courts
have been driven to this result by a belief that to hold
otherwise would be to contravene the axiom that neither the
patent nor the copyright laws apply extraterritorially.
As the above discussion has shown, the reasoning behind
these decisions is unsound: interpreting the intellectual
property laws so that exhaustion results from the sale of an
article abroad does not amount to an extraterritorial
233. See L.A. News Serv. v. Reuters Television Int'l, Ltd., 149 F.3d 987, 99192 (9th Cir. 1998) ("LANS is entitled to recover damages flowing from
exploitation abroad of the domestic acts of infringement committed by
defendants."); Update Art, Inc. v. Modiin Publ'g, Ltd., 843 F.2d 67, 73 (2d Cir.
1988) ("Damages accruing from the illegal infringement in the Israeli
newspapers properly were awarded to Update."); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn
Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 1939), affd, 309 U.S. 390 (1940)
(including in recoverable damages "profits made from exhibiting the infringing
picture outside the United States"); Famous Music Corp. v. Seeco Records, Inc.,
201 F. Supp. 560, 568-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (holding defendant that made
infringing copies of plaintiffs musical compositions in the United States and
shipped them abroad, where other persons used them to make unauthorized
phonograph records, was jointly and severally liable for damages arising from
actions of those abroad).
234. See Schneider (Europe) AG v. SciMed Life Sys., Inc., 39 U.S.P.Q.2d
1596, 1598 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (approving award of "lost profits for foreign sales of
infringing products manufactured in the United States"); Bradley, supra note
204, at 523.
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application of these laws. Such an interpretation would not
result in any regulation of conduct occurring abroad. Nor
would it implicate any of the policy concerns that underlie the
presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. laws.
Indeed, there is no reason in law or policy why an authorized
sale abroad should not result in exhaustion of rights granted
by the U.S. patent and copyright laws.

